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IMAGINING A BETTER PUBLIC HEALTH (LAW)
RESPONSE TO COVID-19
Evan Anderson *
Scott Burris **
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, a group of international experts declared the United
States the country most prepared for a pandemic.1 If they were
right, the response to COVID-19 would have looked something like
this: the federal government would have moved quickly to assess
the threat, define a response, and provide the expertise and resources the country would need to minimize the harm of the most
dangerous pandemic in a century. Its guidance—built on an unparalleled range and depth of relevant expertise, and framed as a longterm strategic plan—would have evolved transparently and credibly as events unfolded. State and local governments and the private sector would have added their specialized knowledge and
awareness of local conditions to apply guidance effectively. Uncertainty would have been placed in the foreground, and everyone
within and outside government would have learned and adapted
together as more information came in and better understanding
grew. Cooperation and public faith in the response would sometimes have faltered, and fringe groups would have acted out, but
**** Senior Fellow, Center for Public Health Initiatives; Senior Fellow, Center for Health
Outcomes and Policy Research; Advanced Senior Lecturer, School of Nursing; Core Faculty,
Masters of Public Health Program, University of Pennsylvania.
**** Professor of Law and Public Health, Temple University Beasley School of Law; Director, Center for Public Health Law Research.
1. The Nuclear Threat Initiative, Center for Health Security at the Johns Hopkins
Bloomberg School of Public Health, and The Economist Intelligence Unit project convened
twenty-one experts from thirteen countries who created a 140-question index to evaluate
the ability of every country to prevent and address rapidly spreading disease. This Global
Security Index assigned the United States perfect scores on numerous underlying metrics
including biosafety, laboratory systems, emergency preparedness and response planning,
linking public health and security authorities, and risk communication. GLOBAL HEALTH
SECURITY INDEX: BUILDING COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 3, 303 (Johns Hopkins Bloomberg Sch. of Pub. Health 2019), https://www.ghsindex.org/wp-content/uplo
ads/2020/04/2019-Global-Health-Security-Index.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LPY-JMBU].
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well-designed measures supported by committed leaders would
have vindicated the experts’ confidence in this great nation’s capacity.
But the experts were wrong. The United States did not respond
effectively to the COVID-19 pandemic; we were not even close to
the league leaders. The nation has higher rates of infection and
infection-related death than almost any peer industrialized country.2 The first year of the pandemic was disastrous, with the United
States accounting for nineteen percent of global mortality with just
four percent of the global population.3 The second year was not
much better. Despite the rapid development of highly effective vaccines, there were more infection-related deaths in 2021 than in
2020 in the United States, due to foreseeable vaccine resistance at
home and the development of variants in the unvaccinated mass of
the global population.4
Several narratives are getting traction in explaining how the
public health system lost its way during COVID-19. The “bad leaders” narrative focuses on the incredible failings of, if not outright

2. According to World Health Organization (“WHO”) data, the United States has the
forty-fifth highest rate of infection at 24,191 per 100,000 population. The United States has
the twenty-first highest mortality rate at 296 per 100,000 population. Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland, Chile, and Latvia are the only Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) member countries with higher
mortality rates, and their high rates may partly reflect more assiduous tracking of COVID19-related deaths. Coronavirus World Map: Tracking the Global Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
10, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/world/covid-cases.html [https://perm
a.cc/APN4-S8PH] (under “Reported cases, deaths, and vaccinations by country,” sort cases
and deaths per 100,000); see also About the OECD, OECD, https://www.oecd.org/about
[https://perma.cc/995R-FMVY] (under “Member countries,” click “View Full List”). Peru,
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Brazil, which also have higher mortality rates, are currently candidates for OECD membership. Press Release, Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev., OECD
Takes First Step in Accession Discussions with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru
and Romania (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-takes-first-step-in-accession-discussions-with-argentina-brazil-bulgaria-croatia-peru-and-romania.htm [https://
perma.cc/6NAU-9748].
3. Howard K. Koh, Alan C. Geller & Tyler J. VanderWeele, Deaths from COVID-19,
325 JAMA 133, 133 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.25381 [https://perma.cc/
JXM3-3ST7] (“The United States, which constitutes 4% of the globe’s population, ranks first
in the world in total pandemic deaths (19% of the global total), with the 12th worst . . .
cumulative mortality rates of all countries.”). The United States also accounted for a disproportionate percentage of cases in the first year. See Jennifer B. Nuzzo, Jessica A. Bell &
Elizabeth E. Cameron, Suboptimal US Response to COVID-19 Despite Robust Capabilities
and Resources, 324 JAMA 1391, 1391 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.17395
[https://perma.cc/9NRZ-3SEY] (“The [United States] accounts for less than 5% of the world’s
population but more than 25% of total COVID-19 cases reported across the globe.”).
4. See Carolyn Crist, U.S. Covid-19 Deaths in 2021 Surpass 2020 Total, WEBMD (Nov.
22, 2021), https://www.webmd.com/lung/news/20211122/us-covid-deaths-2021-surpass-20
20-total [https://perma.cc/59DF-7YW6].
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sabotage by, the Trump administration and its political allies.5 The
“bad budgets” narrative attributes problems in current public
health practice to decades of underinvestment.6 This immiseration
of key sectors of the public health ecosystem, along with related
structural and cultural problems, underlies the “bad institutions”
narrative,7 which takes plenty of force and evidence from the continuing missteps by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), the United States Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”), and other key public health entities.8 The “bad Americans” narrative locates the root of our poor pandemic response in
the selfish, ignorant, and tribal impulses of the populace in their
embrace of Trumpian populism, vaccine denialism, and conspiracy
theories. 9

5. See generally ANDY SLAVITT, PREVENTABLE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW LEADERSHIP
FAILURES, POLITICS, AND SELFISHNESS DOOMED THE U.S. CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE (2021)
(describing Americans’ unwillingness to sacrifice for the welfare of others as a barrier to
adherence to and uptake of public health strategies like masking and vaccination); Amy
Maxmen & Jeff Tollefson, The Problem with Pandemic Planning, 584 NATURE 26, 28–29
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-02277-6 [https://perma.cc/FQQ7-DALJ].
6. Over the past decade, spending for state and local health departments has declined
by 16% and 18%, respectively. Lauren Weber, Laura Ungar, Michelle R. Smith, Hannah
Recht & Anna Maria Barry-Jester, Hollowed-Out Public Health System Faces More Cuts
Amid Virus, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 24, 2020), https://khn.org/news/us-public-healthsystem-underfunded-under-threat-faces-more-cuts-amid-covid-pandemic [https://perma.cc/
74AG-3TSP]. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, an analysis of National Association of
County and City Health Officials’ 2019 National Profile of Local Health Departments revealed that nearly all local health departments experienced a decrease in emergency preparedness funding compared to prior years. Aaron A. Alford, Karla Feeser, Hall Kellie &
Laura Biesiadecki, Prioritization of Public Health Emergency Preparedness Funding Among
Local Health Departments Preceding the COVID-19 Pandemic: Findings from NACCHO’s
2019 National Profile of Local Health Departments, 27 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRACTICE
215, 216 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1097/PHH.0000000000001338 [https://perma.cc/6TNUS8KA].
7. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ETHERIDGE, SENTINEL FOR HEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 59–60, 157–58, 279, 311 (noting that CDC is so starved for
budgetary support that each branch competes against the others with little incentive or
practice of working together).
8. See MICHAEL LEWIS, THE PREMONITION: A PANDEMIC STORY xiii–xv (2021) (describing the limitations of CDC mostly through the perspective of a former local and current state
public health official); SCOTT GOTTLIEB, UNCONTROLLED SPREAD: WHY COVID-19 CRUSHED
US AND HOW WE CAN DEFEAT THE NEXT PANDEMIC 4, 8, 10, 66–67 (2021) (describing the
missteps by CDC and FDA especially related to testing and the poor communication mostly
from an insider perspective).
9. SLAVITT, supra note 5, at xii–xiv. One narrative that has yet to take hold, but is
important to consider, is that this virus was just too hard to beat. See, e.g., Ed Yong, How
the Pandemic Defeated America, ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2020, 1:12 PM), https://www.theatlantic.
com/magazine/archive/2020/09/coronavirus-american-failure/614191 [https://perma.cc/4NY
C-EBL5] (“SARS‑CoV‑2 is something of an anti-Goldilocks virus: just bad enough in every
way. Its symptoms can be severe enough to kill millions but are often mild enough to allow
infections to move undetected through a population. It spreads quickly enough to overload
hospitals, but slowly enough that statistics don’t spike until too late.”). We reacted poorly in
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Each of these stories captures part of the truth. Legal failure is
also an important part of the story. Deep inequities and inefficiencies in U.S. law made us more vulnerable and less able to react to
COVID-19. Law has been instrumental in making the United
States a highly inequitable society characterized by racial and economic segregation10 and a lack of basic protections for lower-income people.11 The pandemic’s significant health disparities highlighted—preyed on—the structural racism and inequality that law
continues to uphold.12 The most prolific jailor in the world, the
United States, went into COVID-19 with nearly two million incarcerated people at high risk of infection.13 About the same number
of people live in poorly regulated nursing homes and other congregate care facilities,14 with underpaid staff often working in multiple settings with far less than the bare minimum of labor rights.
Facially neutral laws had their well-known inequitable effects: the
lack of legally mandated sick leave applied to rich and poor alike,

the United States, but very few countries have done consistently well, and most in that
group had the foresight to be islands or city-states. This perspective is important for both
its cautionary and precautionary humility: it is cautionary in that heads should not roll for
failures beyond control, and precautionary in that the limits of effective action must be
properly considered at the outset and throughout the control effort—given the scarcity of
resources, attention, and credibility, it is reckless, not heroic, to attempt the impossible in
pandemic response.
10. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 5–6 (2017) (describing how federal, state, and local governments produced and perpetuated dramatic racial segregation through zoning
laws, public housing policies, subsidies, and tax policies).
11. See, e.g., NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL & INST. OF MED., U.S. HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES, POORER HEALTH 1 (Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Aron eds.,
2013) (analyzing causes of socioeconomic health inequities in the United States).
12. The law’s manifold failures to promote and protect equity are not the focus of this
Article, but they require a steady chorus of mea culpas. Zinzi D. Bailey, Justin M. Feldman
& Mary T. Bassett, How Structural Racism Works — Racist Policies as a Root Cause of U.S.
Racial Health Inequities, 384 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 768, 768–70 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1056/
NEJMms2025396 [https://perma.cc/GAJ2-BTVJ]; see, e.g., Nancy Krieger, ENOUGH:
COVID-19, Structural Racism, Police Brutality, Plutocracy, Climate Change—and Time for
Health Justice, Democratic Governance, and an Equitable, Sustainable Future, 110 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1620, 1620 (2020), https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2020.305886 [https://
perma.cc/U532-7YNG]; Michelle Jackson & Brian Holzman, A Century of Educational Inequality in the United States, 117 PNAS 19108, 19108 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.
1907258117 [https://perma.cc/YY5V-JL5P].
13. JACOB KANG-BROWN, CHASE MONTAGNET & JASMINE HEISS, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
PEOPLE IN JAIL AND PRISON IN 2020, at 2–3 (2021), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/people-in-jail-and-prison-in-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD4X-2NTY].
14. LAUREN HARRIS-KOJETIN, MANISHA SENGUPTA, JESSICA PENN LENDON, VINCENT
ROME, ROBERTO VALVERDE & CHRISTINE CAFFREY, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., LONGTERM CARE PROVIDERS AND SERVICES USERS IN THE UNITED STATES 2015–2016:
ANALYTICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES 1 (2019), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/se
ries/sr_03/sr03_43-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LNN-NTG4].
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but it was only the less well-off who felt the economic pressure to
show up sick.15
To be sure, some of the legal work went well—at first. Public
health law defining the legal infrastructure for emergency response and pandemic control was ready for COVID-1916 and initially functioned in nearly all respects as it had been designed to
over the past two decades. Federal and state officials had the authority they needed to carry out surveillance and control measures.
The president, governors, and mayors invoked emergency authority to act quickly. The spending power was dramatically used not
only to stabilize the economy and protect millions of families from
sudden destitution, but also to stimulate and impel necessary action from industry.17 The federal government had ample discretion
and legal tools to expedite the production of vaccines and essential
medical supplies. The courts were open to address the claims of
those who felt that control measures violated their rights or exceeded the emergency powers delegated to executive agencies.
Unfortunately, as the pandemic persisted and the other failures
multiplied, the law increasingly became a barrier to pandemic control. Judges bought into the false narrative that COVID-19’s risks
were exaggerated and to the hysterical exaggeration of the liberty
interest in not wearing masks or being vaccinated. COVID-19
cases implicating agency powers or touching religion became vehicles for the Supreme and lower court jurists to advance preexisting
legal agendas of nondelegation18 and expansion of the free exercise
15. See, e.g., Deepa Das Acevedo, Essentializing Labor Before, During, and After the
Coronavirus Pandemic, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1093, 1101–02 (2020); Jacob Leibenluft, The
Pandemic Hurts Countries that Don’t Value Workers: Weak Labor Protections Make the
United States More Vulnerable to COVID-19, FOREIGN AFFS. (Aug. 19, 2020), https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-08-19/pandemic-hurts-countries-dont-v
alue-workers [https://perma.cc/DJ7A-WZ5Y].
16. See, e.g., Lindsay K. Cloud, Katie Moran-McCabe, Elizabeth Platt & Nadya Prood,
A Chronological Overview of the Federal, State, and Local Response to COVID-19, in
ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19, at 10, 11–12 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020) (noting that over 1,000 laws were adopted in the first six months of the pandemic at all levels
of government to reduce the incidence and harms of the pandemic).
17. Evan Anderson & Scott Burris, Assuring Essential Medical Supplies During a Pandemic: Using Federal Law to Measure Need, Stimulate Production, and Coordinate Distribution, in COVID-19 POLICY PLAYBOOK: LEGAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SAFER, MORE
EQUITABLE FUTURE 155, 156 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2021) (discussing the use of Centers
for Medicare & Medicaid Services authority to compel private hospitals to share data on
personal protective equipment (“PPE”) and patient characteristics by attaching conditions
to Medicare reimbursement).
18. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Health & Safety Admin.,
142 S. Ct. 661 (2022) (invalidating an Emergency Temporary Standard (“ETS”) requiring
large employers to enforce a rule that mandated either vaccination or masking and testing
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clause.19 Congress backed away from social investments like the
child tax credit.
All these explanations capture part of the failure story and point
to things to change and do differently if Americans want better results next time. In this paper, we want to focus on a different kind
of failure by a particular set of players in the American system.
That crucial failure is a lack of good judgment in the face of uncertainty and irrational behavior. The people who failed are those who
primarily identify (or should identify ex officio regardless of their
background or predilections) as public health professionals: agency
heads and staff at the federal, state, and local level, but also the
broader network of researchers, educators, pundits—and lawyers—who use the concept of public health and their disciplinary
skills to improve population health through collective action.
This group or field or practice we call “public health” obviously
has played a central, though complicated, role in the COVID-19
story. It was the indispensable first responder: public health detected and warned of the emergence of the pandemic and was the
field to whom the world initially looked for information and a plan
of action. Public health had the impetus for initial action: government public health officials had the institutional responsibility and
capacious legal authority to make and implement response plans,
routinely drawing on the broader field of experts outside of the government for data and ideas. In the media, we defined the problem
ahead for the people and identified the main challenges we could
anticipate.
We write “we” because this is the club of which the authors considered themselves members. These are people whose talent and
dedication we have celebrated. They work in organizations we have
served and admired. Far too many of these dedicated servants of
the public good have been unjustifiably and unforgivably

by reasoning that the rule was more impactful on health within and outside of occupational
settings than Congress could have contemplated when ETS authority was conferred in
1970); Midwest Inst. of Health, PLLC v. Governor of Mich., 958 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Mich. 2020)
(invalidating Michigan’s Emergency Powers of the Governor Act as “an unlawful delegation
of legislative power to the executive branch in violation of the Michigan Constitution”).
19. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (invalidating California’s ban on
religious gatherings in private homes based on the so-called most favored nation theory of
the First Amendment, which creates an automatic claim for religious exemption whenever
there are any secular exemptions); see also Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise,
1990 SUP. CT. L. REV. 1, at 49–51 (describing the Supreme Court’s free exercise analysis in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), as a “most-favored nation” theory).
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demonized and terrorized in the last year.20 Yet they—we—did fail,
not each of us or in every case, but as a collective, as a field, as a
“technology” for managing a pandemic. We drew faulty inferences,
gave poor advice, and launched COVID-19 control rules with
shocking indifference to social, psychological, economic, and political factors. Public health cannot be blamed for bad leaders, or
budget cuts, fake news, or bad law. Despite their broad legal authority, health officers are just appointed officials who work for
mayors, governors, and presidents. They do not make budgets or
pass legislation. All of us in public health could certainly fall back
on the defense that we were not heeded or lacked the power to
properly deploy our expertise. But such outward-looking explanations do not capture the elements of the story that are useful to
public health going forward. Knowing who else we can blame does
not help those of us within the field of public health to be better or
do better. Irresponsible leaders, angry Americans, and insufficient
budgets are not “problems” that get in the way of public health—
they are the conditions in which we work, and it just will not do to
point to them as the causes of failure. Where we have agency in
this broad field is over what we do, and there is plenty to talk
about—not just COVID-19, but opioids, 21 obesity,22 and other big
problems we have identified that have not gotten better.
We failed the test we had been preparing for for decades and, as
we will argue in this paper, the failure most important for public
health to acknowledge and address was a sustained (and continuing) failure of judgment, rooted in an insular, technocratic, and immodest professional monoculture. We thought public health was a
broad, transdisciplinary field that understood not just
20. Mike Baker & Danielle Ivory, Why Public Health Faces a Crisis Across the U.S.,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/18/us/coronavirus-publichealth.html [https://perma.cc/5849-FAEQ] (describing the harassment of public health officials).
21. Fatal overdoses have increased by over six times since 1999. Opioid Data
Analysis and Resources, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Mar. 10, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/opioids/data/analysis-resources.html [https://perma.cc/2HPY-S8CS].
Since President Trump declared the opioid crisis a public health emergency in 2017, annual
fatal overdoses have increased 32% to 93,331. See Jesse C. Baumgartner & David C. Radley,
The Drug Overdose Toll in 2020 and Near-Term Actions for Addressing It, COMMONWEALTH
FUND (Aug. 16, 2021), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2021/drug-overdose-toll2020-and-near-term-actions-addressing-it [https://perma.cc/GT92-WEP5].
22. Between 2000 and 2018, the prevalence of obesity in the U.S. rose from 31% to 42%
while the prevalence of severe obesity almost doubled from 5% to 9%. CRAIG M. HALES,
MARGARET D. CARROLL, CHERYL D. FRYAR & CYNTHIA L. OGDEN, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION: NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATS., PREVALENCE OF OBESITY AND
SEVERE OBESITY AMONG ADULTS: UNITED STATES, 2017–2018, at 2–3 (Feb. 2020),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db360.htm [https://perma.cc/4KFC-YD6S].

962

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:955

epidemiology but the social determinants of health and health behavior. It was a field, we thought, where sociologists, psychologists,
political scientists, engineers, and people with lived experience all
had a place and a voice. In our work, we had tried to enlist and
educate public health researchers and professionals in the complex
but vital pursuit of what we call “legal epidemiology,” the scientific
study and use of law as a factor in population health. This rich
melting pot of evidence, theory, methods, and experiences was producing useful information and insights at the very outset of the
pandemic—as we will show— and yet the public health system
used poor decision-making processes and drew on only a narrow
slice of relevant expertise and experience. Certainly, the federal
public health leadership that we will focus on in this paper bears a
solid portion of the blame, but we think the immodesty and insularity they exhibited sadly reflects the dominant culture of the field
as a whole—and has to change.23
This Article is not a thorough-going history of the pandemic response. By way of critique and suggesting a way forward for public
health, we are going to imagine how public health—both the official agencies and the interconnected nodes in academia and health
systems—might have approached COVID-19 differently. This is a
story that focuses on good judgment as the lynchpin of optimal pandemic response and allows us to think about where good judgment
seems to have been lacking, and how public health culture and institutions might change to improve the chances of better judgment
next time.
I. THE COUNTERFACTUAL RESPONSE
We authors are closely identified with the “transdisciplinary
model” of public health law.24 In this model, the work of the law is
23. Harold Pollack, Opinion, Why Public Health Experts Aren’t Reaching Conservatives
on Covid, POLITICO (Aug. 12, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2
021/08/12/conservative-public-health-covid-conservative-affirmative-action-503448 [https://
perma.cc/99XB-RVFB] (“Over my career, I have witnessed many harms inflicted by conservatives’ opposition to syringe exchanges and other essential public health efforts—most
definitely including our current public health crisis. Angered by such memories, ensconced
within a community of like-minded scholars, I might forget that liberal/left communities are
collections of imperfect humans like any other—with our own blind spots and biases arising
from group conformity. Progressive academia often lacks sufficient voices in the room to call
us on our errors. John Stuart Mill reminds us: Those who know only their own side of the
argument know little of that.”).
24. See generally SCOTT BURRIS, MICAH L. BERMAN, MATTHEW PENN & TARA
RAMANATHAN HOLIDAY, THE NEW PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: A TRANSDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
TO PRACTICE AND ADVOCACY (Oxford Univ. Press 2018) (proposing a transdisciplinary model
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not seen simply as a matter delegated to lawyers, but an enterprise
carried out across all the disciplines of public health.25 This is
meant to be an accurate description of how public health laws are
actually devised, enacted, deployed, implemented, and disseminated.26 It reflects an admiring belief in public health as a practical
field that is itself transdisciplinary, a field in which psychologists,
economists, epidemiologists, and engineers—from research and
practice—work together, sharing their perspectives and tools in
the cause of achieving a high level of understanding and effectiveness.27
This diversity of viewpoints, skills, methods, and theoretical
frameworks helps produce the sine qua non of effective public

of advocacy for lawyers and public health practitioners); Scott Burris, Marice Ashe, Donna
Levin, Matthew Penn & Michelle Larkin, A Transdisciplinary Approach to Public Health
Law: The Emerging Practice of Legal Epidemiology, 37 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 135 (2016)
[hereinafter A Transdisciplinary Approach], https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-publhealth032315-021841 [https://perma.cc/58BU-RU4Y] (describing a transdisciplinary model, which
combines scientific practices with legal representation); Scott Burris & Evan Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half Century of Public Health Law Research,
9 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 95 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-lawsocsci-102612134011 [https://perma.cc/P2F2-UAY9] (describing the rise of law as a tool of public health).
25. A Transdisciplinary Approach, supra note 24, at 136–37. This is slightly broader
but similar to notions of transdisciplinarity in developing implementation science theory.
Timothy H. Ciesielski, Melinda C. Aldrich, Carmen J. Marsit, Robert A. Hiatt & Scott M.
Williams, Transdisciplinary Approaches Enhance the Production of Translational
Knowledge, 182 J. LAB’Y & CLINICAL MED. 123, 125 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.trsl.2016.11.002 [https://perma.cc/MMQ4-NR6C] (“Transdisciplinary research does not refer to the combination of fully formed ideas from distinct fields (multidisciplinary research),
or the integration of ideas from distinct fields (interdisciplinary research), rather it refers
to the generation and utilization of research frameworks and ideas that could not come from,
or fit into, any one field. This emergent property of transdisciplinary translational research
can enable us to: (1) explore widely, (2) assess diversely, and (3) intervene effectively in our
efforts to promote human health.”) This piece, which makes several sound points about
transdisciplinarity, also exemplifies the problem in public health. Despite addressing examples of problems that involve human behavior, social environments, and the development of
intervention, the scope of transdisciplinarity by the epidemiologists and geneticists writing
the paper never extends to social, behavioral, or sociolegal science.
26. Scott Burris, Marice Ashe, Doug Blanke, Jennifer Ibrahim, Donna E. Levin, Gene
Matthews, Matthew Penn & Martha Katz, Better Health Faster: The 5 Essential Public
Health Law Services, 131 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 747, 747 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1177/
0033354916667496 [https://perma.cc/8YEF-HL9U].
27. Transdisciplinarity is not merely the intermingling of ideas and practices across
disciplines, but the combining of theories, methods, and other disciplinary resources to produce new knowledge and new modes of action. The lawyer, health researcher, and practitioner not only share insights and expertise with each other but act in ways that blur their
professional identities. Knowledge produced through transdisciplinarity efforts is created
by people with diverse skills, viewpoints, and experiences, organized in temporary arrangements without rigid hierarchy, through processes that ensure quality through transparent
criteria and procedures. Cyrille Rigolot, Transdisciplinarity as a Discipline and a Way of
Being: Complementarities and Creative Tensions, 7 HUMANS. & SOC. SCIS. COMMC’NS 1, 2
(2020), https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00598-5 [https://perma.cc/5FGB-GU24].
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health work—good judgment under conditions of uncertainty, scarcity, and political and social division. It rests on a view of public
health as scrappy, daring, smart, science driven, committed to
health equity, and, above all, strategic. This is the vision of public
health we carried as COVID-19 arrived; it was a vision public
health had not always lived up to perfectly, but it had eradicated
smallpox, dramatically driven down road deaths, and helped us get
through HIV/AIDS.28 We had faith that it would help us muddle
through the COVID-19 pandemic. Boy, were we disappointed—but
more on that later.
For now, we go from idealism to pure fantasy. As the most direct
way to talk about the counterfactual of a strategic, transdisciplinary public health response to COVID-19, we invite you to join us
in imagining the Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary’s
Operations Center (“SOC”) in Washington, D.C., the hub for emergency operations in the department that oversees all the key
health agencies.29 It is the week of December 31, 2019, and HHS
Secretary Alex Azar and his brain trust are coming together to address reports of a new virus in Wuhan.30

28. Burris et al., supra note 24, at 96–98.
29. SOC describes itself as “the primary emergency operations center (EOC) for HHS.
The mission of the SOC is to protect the health, safety, and security of the nation by serving
as the 24/7/365 focal point for public health and medical information collection, sharing, and
analysis, as well as facilitating the coordination of HHS preparedness, response, recovery,
and mitigation operational resource requirements. The SOC maintains a ‘steady-state’
twenty-four-hour watch function for situational awareness of any emerging situation, nationally or internationally, which may require a coordinated health and medical federal disaster response.” HHS Secretary’s Operations Center, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/responders/soc/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/SS
5W-2HSF]. In this paper, we focus on federal actors, who set the broad outlines of policy in
our public health system. We note in places that this system is also importantly influenced
by academics who serve on government advisory committees as unofficial sources of information and guidance and offer their opinions in the media. We do not say much about state
and local health officials, but because they reenact many of the decision-making, planning,
and implementation steps of the federal team in their jurisdictions, our general points apply
to them as well.
30. Secretary Azar learned about the emerging coronavirus on December 30 from an
advisory Taiwan sent to WHO imploring it to investigate a concerning outbreak of a respiratory virus in the Wuhan province. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 38. The next day Chinese
authorities in Wuhan announced that they were, in fact, treating almost thirty cases of respiratory disease of unknown origin. Id. at 34. Taiwan began immediate screening of all
symptomatic people arriving by plane from Wuhan that afternoon. C. Jason Wang, Chun Y.
Ng & Robert H. Brook, Response to COVID-19 in Taiwan: Big Data Analytics, New Technology, and Proactive Testing, 323 JAMA 1341, 1341 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1001/
jama.2020.3151 [https://perma.cc/94J8-UDJ6].
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A. The SWOT Analysis
We imagine Azar and his team recognizing very early on that
COVID-19 could be the big one: the readily transmissible, significantly deadly airborne pathogen that we had all been fearing for
at least twenty years. Just a few months before, HHS had wargamed precisely this scenario in a tabletop exercise called Crimson
Contagion, which predicted that an outbreak of an influenza-like
respiratory disease in China would overwhelm the U.S. health system and cause 110 million infections, 7.7 million hospitalizations,
and 586 thousand deaths before it could be brought under control.31
Everyone in the room would know that no serious remedial action
had been undertaken in response to the exercise, so the first step
in responding to a potentially massive threat would be a clear-eyed
SWOT32 analysis of the U.S. public health system as it faced a possible real-life Crimson Contagion.
In addition to the general wealth and technological resources of
the United States, the public health system certainly looked
strong.33 CDC had an ample stock of credibility as the world’s leading health agency.34 Azar also sat at the head of federal health research, drawing on the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) for
everything from the expertise and practical experience of Anthony
Fauci, through the trove of bench science on viral genomes and
RNA vaccines, to the resources for mobilizing the nation’s health
researchers to develop pharmaceutical countermeasures. FDA had

31. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR
PREPAREDNESS & RESPONSE, CRIMSON CONTAGION 2019 FUNCTIONAL EXERCISE AFTERACTION REPORT 9–10 (2020).
32. In a SWOT analysis, organizational leaders assess their strengths, weakness, opportunities, and threats. The first two are internal features, and the latter two are external
features. Marilyn M. Helms & Judy Nixon, Exploring SWOT Analysis – Where Are We Now?
A Review of Academic Research from the Last Decade, 3 J. STRATEGY & MGMT. 215, 216
(2010), https://doi.org/10.1108/17554251011064837 [https://perma.cc/L6TK-MQY4] (reviewing the history and use of SWOT analysis).
33. See GLOBAL HEALTH SECURITY INDEX, supra note 1, at 8, 20–21 (describing how a
group of international experts had identified the United States as the country most prepared
for a pandemic).
34. See, e.g., Sudip Parikh, CDC: Remember Who You Are, STAT (Apr. 8, 2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/08/cdc-remember-who-you-are [https://perma.cc/T3H7-7
P2E] (“The CDC not only set the standard for what a national public health agency does,
but it trained others to carry out that mission around the world. Several generations of the
world’s disease detectives have been trained in the CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service.
These alumni now populate public health agencies around the world. Quietly and effectively, the CDC projected American competence and leadership. Around the world, public
health agencies across Asia, Africa, and Europe are called ‘CDC,’ despite the fact that the
acronym may be meaningless in the home language.”).
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the capacity and processes for approving new vaccines, tests, treatments, and medical devices. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (“NIOSH”) could bring relevant engineering expertise—including the physics of airborne transmission—
into safety discussions for hospitals, nursing homes, factories,
schools, and other settings. There was a Strategic National Stockpile (“SNS”) of pandemic response equipment, and Azar could invoke the Defense Production Act to stimulate production, purchasing, and allocation of essential resources.35
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) had
vital levers for coordinating and buttressing healthcare delivery.
Because public and private hospitals alike rely heavily on CMS reimbursement, CMS can require hospitals to change practices and
share new information by placing conditions on funding.36 The role
of CMS reimbursement in outpatient services makes it the functional regulator of telehealth, which has obvious benefits during a
pandemic.37 The same dynamics apply to long-term services and
35. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. § 4511; Anderson et al., supra note 17, at
170, 171.
36. See ELAYNE J. HEISLER, BRYCE H. P. MENDEZ, ALISON MITCHELL, SIDATH VIRANGA
PANANGALA & MARCO A. VILLAGRANA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44376, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR
GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION: AN OVERVIEW 1, 1, 3 (2018) (“In FY2012, the last year of
data available for all federal sources of [graduate medical education] GME payments, the
federal government spent an estimated $15 billion on GME, which was the largest federal
investment in the health care workforce.”). CMS eventually promulgated regulations requiring hospitals to report various COVID-19 data metrics on a daily or weekly basis as a
condition to receive federal funds. 42 C.F.R. § 482(e) (2020); see also Anderson et al., supra
note 17, at 155, 156 tbl.24 (highlighting the frequency and specifics of the personal protective
equipment (“PPE”) reporting requirements imposed by CMS). This leverage was brought to
bear in fall of 2020 because hospitals refused to share data about PPE on hand or about
cases and mortality. Press Release, Rick Pollack, President & CEO, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, AHA
Statement on Interpretive Guidance on CMS Data Collection (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.aha.org/press-releases/2020-10-06-aha-statement-interpretive-guidance-cmsdata-collection [https://perma.cc/39BU-RF8U]. A similar CMS regulation that required
COVID-19 vaccination for hospital staff as a condition for funding narrowly withstood constitutional challenges before the Supreme Court under evolving nondelegation jurisprudence. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Omnibus COVID-19 Health Care Staff Vaccination, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,555, 61,619 (Nov. 5, 2021) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 482(g));
Response to Application for a Stay Pending Appeal at 26, Biden v. Missouri, 142 S. Ct. 647
(2022). Increasing willingness to scrutinize agency power in such emergency rulemaking,
even in the face of substantial public health needs, was evident in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus.
v. Dep’t of Lab., Occupational Safety & Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 661 (2022), discussed supra
note 18.
37. For an analysis of legal authorities available to reshape telehealth, see Cason D.
Schmit, Johnathan Schwitzer, Kevin Survance, Megan Barbre, Yeka Nmadu & Carly
McCord, Telehealth in the COVID-19 Pandemic, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO
COVID-19, at 123, 124–26 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 2020). Regulatory action by CMS reshaped telehealth in 2020. Before the pandemic, there were about 13,000 fee-for-service
telehealth visits by Medicare beneficiaries each week; in just the last week of April 2020,
there were over 1.6 million such visits. Seema Verma, Early Impact of CMS Expansion of
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supports (e.g., nursing homes, home-based care), two-thirds of
which are funded by Medicaid and Medicare.38 During declared
emergencies, Medicaid enrollment and disenrollment processes
can be reshaped to ensure health care needs are met.39
Also in the room would be Robert Kadlec, Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response (“ASPR”). The ASPR’s mission is
to lead preparedness and response efforts to public health emergencies by coordinating the efforts of healthcare entities, government agencies, and private industry. Congress had repeatedly (and
recently40) emphasized the importance of the ASPR’s mission. The
2006 law that created the ASPR required all government agencies
to formulate preparedness plans, HHS to produce a National
Health Security Strategy for Congress every four years, and a
yearly review of the SNS.41
From the lawyer’s perspective, the mission and authority conferred upon HHS and its various agencies would also look like a
big advantage.42 Political leaders and the public would initially
look to CDC for guidance, so it started with the impetus to act, and

Medicare Telehealth During COVID-19, HEALTH AFFS. FOREFRONT (July 15, 2020),
https://doi.org/10.1377/forefront.20200715.454789 [https://perma.cc/33GM-LF35]. By October of 2020, over a third of the 63 million current Medicare beneficiaries received healthcare
virtually. Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Trump Administration Finalizes Permanent Expansion of Medicare Telehealth Services and Improved Payment for
Time Doctors Spend with Patients (Dec. 1, 2020), https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-re
leases/trump-administration-finalizes-permanent-expansion-medicare-telehealth-servicesand-improved-payment [https://perma.cc/J5EJ-HN26].
38. KIRSTEN J. COLELLO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10343, WHO PAYS FOR LONG-TERM
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS? (2018) (noting that Medicaid and Medicare finance 64.0% of all
LTSS spending nationwide).
39. For a discussion of the failure of the federal government to wield this lever effectively and equitably during Hurricane Katrina, see Jeanne M. Lambrew & Donna E.
Shalala, Federal Health Policy Response to Hurricane Katrina: What It Was and What It
Could Have Been, 296 JAMA 1394, 1394–96 (2006).
40. The requirements of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No.
109-417 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1) had been reauthorized in 2019. Pandemic
and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-22
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1).
41. Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-417 (2006) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 300hh-1).
42. Few would have predicted that a President would choose not to take steps to promote the common good. Such intransigence is now recognized as a problematic feature of
emergency preparedness laws, which presume executives will vigorously invoke and apply
emergency powers. David E. Pozen & Kim Lane Schepple, Executive Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise, 114 AM. J. INT’L. L. 608, 613 (2020) (suggesting that laws should be
revised to obligate action because Trump took so few reasonable steps authorized during
declared emergencies).
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the Secretary was empowered to declare a health emergency.43
Taking advantage of that authority, he would draw on powerful
information networks constituted not only by partner agencies at
the domestic and global levels, but also the lifelong personal connections of HHS staff with experts in other agencies and academia.
Secretary Azar and his advisors would also, we hope, have been
clear-eyed about the serious weaknesses they would have to account for in any plan of action. They should have been uncomfortably aware of the extent to which the foundations of CDC’s reputation were shaky, and of the risks of blinding professional bias
within the agency and its networks. CDC had struggled with basic
public health operations in recent years. A single case of possible
drug resistant tuberculosis had led to an international fiasco of
botched control measures.44 Its laboratories had repeatedly failed
basic tests of competency in managing biohazardous material,45
and there had been longstanding concern about brain drain.46 Of
particular importance, the agency had produced a monumentally
faulty test during the Zika outbreak in 201647 by trying to add too
many serologic bells and whistles.48 Even more concerning, the

43. See, e.g., James G. Hodge & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal
Triage During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 260 (2008)
(describing the flexible authority afforded to government through emergencies and disasters
declarations).
44. Janice Hopkins Tanne, Tuberculosis Case Exposes Flaws in International Public
Health Systems, 334 BRIT. MED. J. 1187, 1187 (2007) (detailing the various missteps of
health officials including failures to adhere to the international health regulations).
45. Ian Swanson, Ebola Czar: Mishandling of Samples ‘Unacceptable,’ HILL (Dec. 28,
2014, 11:31 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/228139-ebola-czar-mishandling-ofsamples-unacceptable [https://perma.cc/V6VW-HJ9V] (describing an accidental transfer of
Ebola to CDC’s main offices).
46. See Helen Pearson, Claims of Brain Drain Follow CDC Reshuffle, 443 NATURE 250,
250–51 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1038/443250a [https://perma.cc/PZ6J-JF68] (describing internal discontent and departures after the CDC director created another layer of bureaucracy and reduced some autonomy of the various centers including their control over budgeting).
47. David Willman, Lessons Unlearned: Four Years Before the CDC Fumbled Coronavirus Testing, the Agency Made some of the same Mistakes with Zika, WASH. POST
(July 4, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/lessons-unlearned-fouryears-before-the-cdc-fumbled-coronavirus-testing-the-agency-made-some-of-the-same-mist
akes-with-zika/2020/07/03/c32ca530-a8af-11ea-94d2-d7bc43b26bf9_story.html [https://per
ma.cc/6EFU-R824] (“Amid a feared outbreak of the newly emerged Zika virus, senior CDC
officials in 2016 sidelined an effective test for it—and instead directed public health laboratories nationwide to use a more complicated test that failed about one-third of the time.”).
48. Id. (“CDC scientists . . . saw the emerging Zika crisis as an opportunity to deploy a
new—and more elaborate—approach to detecting the virus. Instead of using the molecular
test to look only for Zika, they would also target five additional pathogens . . . [T]he CDC
would manufacture and distribute the Trioplex test kits, each with 41 pages of instructions,
versus two for [the other test].”).
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agency refused to disclose the test’s faults or the availability of a
better test, and unfairly punished the CDC whistleblower who
brought it all to light.49 This poor recent record should have been
top of mind given the obvious importance of testing to any control
effort. Cheap, effective tests would be needed to identify the infected and infectious, and the need for more sophisticated tests
that could track viral mutation was eminently foreseeable.50
Beyond those surrounding the narrow task of creating a test and
supporting its use, there should have been concerns about the operational strength of CDC in the rapid decision making and on-theground logistics needed during a fast-moving crisis with a large
footprint. Many viewed CDC as having given up its primary identity as an operational public health agency and instead having become more like an academic research shop.51 The modern CDC had
49. Id.
50. Testing and its role in prevention provides one of the more compelling instances of
judgment challenges in the COVID-19 story. In December 2021, CDC Director Rochelle Walensky issued guidelines for an abbreviated isolation period after infection. Press Release,
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, CDC Updates and Shortens Recommended Isolation
and Quarantine Period for General Population (Dec. 27, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/media/
releases/2021/s1227-isolation-quarantine-guidance.html
[https://perma.cc/33EG-JEQH].
CDC was facing the problem that Omicron’s infectiousness was making it hard for various
essential systems to operate if workers were infected, but not making workers so incapacitated they had to isolate for ten days. CDC also had to face the fact that two years into the
pandemic America still lacked an abundant supply of cheap at-home antigen tests. Instead
of transparently explaining the dilemma, though, Walensky justified the lack of a testing
requirement for leaving the abbreviated isolation by discounting the value of testing to identify infectiousness. In a double blow to her credibility (and to any claim of good judgment),
some of the most obvious evidence that she was wrong came from the pre-CDC Dr. Rochelle
Walensky herself. See, e.g., A. David Paltiel & Rochelle P. Walensky, Screening to Prevent
SARS-CoV-2 Outbreaks: Saliva-Based Antigen Testing Is Better than the PCR Swab,
HEALTH AFFS. FOREFRONT (Sept. 11, 2020), https://doi.org/10.1377/forefront.20200909.
430047 [https://perma.cc/7MK3-PAVN] (asserting that rapid, saliva-based antigen tests are
the “preferred tool for outbreak control”); Rochelle P. Walensky & Carlos Del Rio, From
Mitigation to Containment of the COVID-19 Pandemic: Putting the SARS-CoV-2 Genie Back
in the Bottle, 323 JAMA 1889, 1889 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.6572
[https://perma.cc/9M5D-9EGL] (stating that “testing is critical” for mitigation and containment of the COVID-19 pandemic); A. David Paltiel, Amy Zheng & Rochelle P. Walensky,
Assessment of SARS-CoV-2 Screening Strategies to Permit the Safe Reopening of College
Campuses in the United States, JAMA NETWORK OPEN e2016818, at 8 (2020),
https://doi.org/10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.16818 [https://perma.cc/MR2Q-6NMQ] (asserting that the safe return of college students to residential campuses requires “a highly
specific screening test that can easily be administered to students every 1 to 7 days”); see
also Zeynep Tufekci, The C.D.C. Is Hoping You’ll Figure Covid out on Your Own, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 5, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/05/opinion/omicron-covid-testing-cdc.html
[https://perma.cc/DS22-WB5D] (discussing controversy and reporting Walensky’s statement
that “[w]e opted not to have the rapid test for isolation because we actually don’t know how
our rapid tests perform and how well they predict whether you’re transmissible during the
end of disease”).
51. See, e.g., Maggie Koerth, COVID-19 Was Always Going to Be a Struggle for the CDC.
But Trump Sure Didn’t Help., FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 30, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://fivethir
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never been especially vigorous in the groundwork control of infectious disease epidemics in the United States.52 It was poorly designed to convene and lead other agencies,53 and its current director was a virologist and lab researcher by training and experience
who had never run a public health agency.
Bureaucracy itself was a weakness. FDA, which would be largely
responsible for shepherding new tests, vaccines, and supplies to
market, was both a center of scientific excellence and a data- and
form-processor through layers of officials and committees. FDA’s
approval processes are designed to assure that products are safe
and effective in fact and—as importantly—in public perception.
Emergency approval could legally be granted on an expedited basis, but FDA had never used this authority against such high
stakes and under such public scrutiny.54 There was also bureaucratic infighting to deal with. Azar had a contentious relationship
with CMS head Seema Verna, who was only still serving on the
condition that she would never have to work directly with him.55

tyeight.com/features/covid-19-was-always-going-to-be-a-struggle-for-the-cdc [https://perma.
cc/52SJ-ND89] (quoting Richard Besser, a former acting director of CDC, who stated that
“CDC is an extremely academic institution”); Jeneen Interlandi, Covid Proved the C.D.C. Is
Broken. Can It Be Fixed?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
06/16/magazine/cdc-covid-response.html [https://perma.cc/8LV9-SKMV] (quoting William
Darrow, former head of the Behavioral and Prevention Research Branch, as noting “I’d go
into a meeting and say, ‘What needs to be done?’ . . . And they’d give me a five-point chart.
And then I’d ask, ‘Well why aren’t we doing those things?’ And it was all hemming and
hawing about whether we could convince the states, or get top leadership to support it, or if
it would be controversial”).
52. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 256 (describing Charity Dean’s frustration, as a local
health officer in California, with trying to get CDC to support her investigations of hepatitis
and tuberculosis outbreaks). Further back in the annals of CDC’s predecessor, the Marine
Hospital Service, we can certainly find cases of on-the-ground federal disease control. See,
e.g., MARILYN CHASE, THE BARBARY PLAGUE: THE BLACK DEATH IN VICTORIAN SAN
FRANCISCO 32–33 (2003) (recounting role of future Surgeon General Rupert Blue and NIH
lab founder Joseph Kinyoun in controlling bubonic plague). And, officers in CDC’s Epidemic
Intelligence Service have done heroic epidemiological work investigating outbreaks of diseases like Legionnaire’s Disease and Ebola. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, EPIDEMIC INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (EIS): A SNAPSHOT OF PUBLIC HEALTH
ACHIEVEMENTS 2, 5, 9 (2015).
53. Interlandi, supra note 51 (quoting William Darrow, former head of the Behavioral
and Prevention Research Branch, as noting that “[w]e are really good at drilling down, . . .
[b]ut terrible at looking up and reaching across”).
54. These processes are not perfect even under normal circumstances. For example,
FDA infamously failed in multiple ways in its regulation of OxyContin, contributing to a
surge of opioid-related harms. See Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin:
Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 221, 225 (2009),
https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2007.131714 [ https://perma.cc/9ZEP-YZVN].
55. SLAVITT, supra note 5, at 82.
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Crimson Contagion had already pointed out that availability of
key medical supplies was going to be a grave weakness if demand
spiked. The SNS had been depleted from an influenza epidemic in
2009 and had only twelve million N-95 masks in stock;56 it had
been designed and managed to respond to an anthrax attack or influenza pandemic and was not prepared for the contingency of a
coronavirus.57 Ability to surge production and purchasing of critical supplies was limited by fragile supply chains running through
countries that would need the same supplies and confront the same
work disruptions.
Stepping back from HHS, Azar’s team would know that the public health system that would be called upon to manage the crisis
was not a system at all, but rather thousands of state and local
health officers who report to hundreds of elected officials and
whose powers were conditioned by state law and local politics.58
The health care side was cut off from direct CDC cooperation by
the organizational chart of HHS and by a century of practical separation.59 Any effort to mobilize this system would confront massively decayed infrastructure on at least two key dimensions. First,
the processes for transmitting health information were closer to

56. Jeanne Whalen, Rosalind S. Helderman & Tom Hamburger, Inside America’s Mask
Crunch: A Slow Government Reaction and an Industry Wary of Liability, WASH. POST
(Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-americas-mask-crunch-aslow-government-reaction-and-an-industry-wary-of-liability/2020/04/02/b3155e2a-6f85-11e
a-aa80-c2470c6b2034_story.html [https://perma.cc/JY8F-JN55].
57. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 159 (“A lot of the stockpile’s resources had been carefully
curated to counter specific pathogens—anthrax, smallpox, and especially bird flu. A lot of
emphasis was put on developing and stockpiling drugs and vaccines to counter these individual threats. Less emphasis was placed on building broad capabilities that would be
needed to respond to a pandemic with virus we didn’t anticipate, which would create a run
on items like masks, ventilators and testing supplies.”).
58. LEWIS, supra note 8, at 131; see also Interlandi, supra note 51 (quoting Tom Frieden,
former director of CDC that “[s]tate and local health departments often feel like C.D.C. is
clueless about the challenges they face and the realities of their work . . . [a]nd they are not
entirely wrong in that”). The fragmented state of public health is a key theme in Michael
Lewis’ account of the early pandemic response. The protagonist in his book is a former California local and state public health official who laments the lack of support from CDC not
just during COVID-19 but during earlier disease outbreaks. See LEWIS, supra note 8, at
130–31.
59. Anderson et al., supra note 17, at 170–72. Hospitals initially refused to share data
about hospital beds, PPE on hand, infections, and deaths. The Trump administration conditioned Medicare reimbursement on delivery of that data in October of 2020. The struggle
to access and merge hospital data in the United States contrasted sharply with experiences
in other countries. In Taiwan, for example, cases were identified by searching for patients
with severe respiratory symptoms using data from the National Health Insurance program
and national electronic health records. See Wang et al., supra note 30, at 1341.
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the Pony Express than the World Wide Web.60 This was going to
hamper both operations (like tracking people exposed to the virus
as they moved across and within borders) and situational awareness, as outbreak data got stuck at various points in the pipeline.61
Second and related in cause, the resources of health agencies were
barely sufficient for normal operations; there were too few people
with the training and equipment to actually implement case finding and control measures at any sort of scale. A few dozen Ebola
cases had strained capacity in the past—this could be millions of
cases and contacts.
The society and the economy were also weak for pandemic response in some key respects. A respiratory disease will spread
more rapidly if sick people are going to work and school, taking
public transportation, and living in crowded conditions. The
United States is notorious for its lack of guaranteed paid sick leave
for workers, which would be a particular problem for low-wage
workers who could not afford to miss a paycheck, let alone lose a
job—and who might be working more than one job. Basic services
like health care and food production and distribution would have
to be maintained, posing serious risks to the essential workers who
would keep them going. Low-paid health care workers with jobs in
more than one nursing home could be a major vector of spread in
congregate settings. Although the Affordable Care Act had reduced
the number of uninsured people, there were still 30 million who

60. In California, an academic lab doing free genomic testing for local health agencies
had to buy fax machines for many offices which lacked any or had outdated models. John
Dickerson, Doctors, Scientists Who Warned Officials About Oncoming Pandemic Focus of
Michael Lewis Book, CBS NEWS (Aug. 1, 2021, 6:56 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/mi
chael-lewis-premonition-60-minutes-2021-08-01 [https://perma.cc/FE3R-PQCT] (“It was the
first fax machine I’d seen in years. But the problem was, after we faxed these results, we
got a call the next day sayin’, ‘Why did you only return half the results?’ We realized that
their circa early ‘90s fax machine only had a page buffer that could hold about half the
results we sent. So we literally went back to Best Buy, got another curbside delivery, and
drove up a new fax machine up to that county public health office because they didn’t have
the budget to buy their own new one.”).
61. California hospitals could not share data with government because there was no
associated hospital billing code to organize the hospital activity and labor. See LEWIS, supra
note 8, at 248–49. CDC relied almost entirely on a syndromic surveillance system with serious limitations. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 78–83 (noting that CDC based early assessment of virus penetration on the influenza-like illness surveillance system, which monitors
influenza by drawing data from public health labs, hospital labs, and Medicare billing,
which are reported with weeks or months of lag time, and emphasizing that the syndromic
approach is limited for a disease with so many asymptomatic cases).
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would have limited access to a doctor and therefore be inclined to
show up in the emergency room.62
Finally, there was national leadership. Our public health laws
reflect a legal and political tradition of leaving health emergencies
primarily in the hands of the health experts. The original model of
the Board of Health was just the group of doctors and other brave
people willing to take charge (and not flee the city) in an epidemic,
and it gave those stalwart souls broad power to do whatever was
necessary.63 Nonetheless, it is an element of our system—arguably
a strength on average—that politicians are the ultimate deciders,
and they have also tended to assert control when there are factions
of the polity unhappy with public health measures.64 Azar had
firsthand experience with Trump and his predictably unpredictable ways. Importantly, Trump’s disdain for bureaucrats and cooperation with other nations was already manifest. Domestically,
Trump was a symptom of widespread distress and contention as
much as he was a cause. Public discourse had been coarsened and
polarized over social media over the last decade. It was clear that
it would be difficult conveying risk and motivating action without
amplifying social tribalism and political partisanship.
There also were external strengths—“opportunities” in the
SWOT vernacular—to consider. Our CDC was no longer a unique
repository of public health expertise and experience. CDC clones
around the world—and in China itself—could provide visibility
into the virus long before it reached American shores.65 Many of
those countries and their scientists had relevant experience to
share, having recently encountered serious respiratory disease
outbreaks. The United States also stood to benefit from a global
scientific revolution in genomics over the last decade, which could

62. KENNETH FINEGOLD, ANN CONMY, ROSE C. CHU, ARIELLE BOSWORTH & BENJAMIN
D. SOMMERS, OFF. OF HEALTH POL’Y, TRENDS IN THE U.S. UNINSURED POPULATION, 2010–
2020, at 1–2 (2021), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/private/pdf/265041/trends-in-theus-uninsured.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AAB-Y5V7].
63. See generally J.H. POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD: THE GREAT PLAGUE OF YELLOW
FEVER IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1793 (1949) (describing the evaporation of federal, state, and
local governments and the role of a volunteer board); CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA
YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 1832, 1849, AND 1866 (1962) (describing the emergence of
modern public health systems through three epidemics).
64. This happened, for example, when President Obama appointed Ron Klain to manage the response to Ebola. Jake Tapper, First on CNN: Obama Will Name Ron Klain as
Ebola Czar, CNN POL. (Oct. 19, 2014, 2:07 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/17/poli
tics/ebola-czar-ron-klain/index.html [https://perma.cc/ULE7-K9GC].
65. In fact, Robert Redfield communicated multiple times with his China CDC counterpart between January 1 and January 4. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 48–49.
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expedite new tools for tracking and interrupting disease transmission. There was no world war—like there was in 1918—to frustrate
cooperation or stymie relatively candid sharing of knowledge.66
There was, in other words, a huge opportunity to save millions of
lives through global cooperation. The fact that we knew pretty
early that the outbreak in Wuhan was likely to be serious, combined with the fact that we quickly received the viral genome,
meant that we had an opportunity to prepare for what was to come.
The external threats, like the internal weaknesses, were formidable. The biggest was the subject itself: this new virus could be
the big one, one that would spread all over the world in successive
waves, mutating as it spread. Almost as bad could be the global
response. The dismal state of the global health system and American global leadership were big potential problems. WHO, for better
and for worse, serves the nations of the world—and particularly
serves those who pony up money67—and operates by consensus.
Like CDC, it had developed a reputation for bureaucratic caution,
and its legal authority was set out in International Health Regulations with significant limitations and known flaws. In theory, these
regulations were meant to undergird cooperation among nations
coordinated by WHO, but there was nothing in them to stop panicked global leaders from letting loose a cascade of individual travel
restrictions, which could quickly disrupt supply chains we depend
on for basic products not made in the United States like masks.
These could trigger economic and social effects of a sort that SARS
and Ebola had hinted at in recent decades but at a scale not seen
in modern times.

66. The 1918 pandemic was known as the Spanish Flu because Spain openly admitted
widespread cases. Spain had no more cases than other large countries but was one of the
few major powers not then engaged in WWI so had no geostrategic reasons to deny cases.
MICHAEL GREGER, BIRD FLU: A VIRUS OF OUR OWN HATCHING 3 (2006).
67. There was special concern—amplified by shifting funding towards China and the
Trump administration’s ongoing trade disputes with China—that any action of WHO would
be viewed skeptically as protective of Chinese interests. Drew Hinshaw & Lukas I. Alpert,
U.S. Allies Leave WHO Funding Gap Unfilled as China and Others Step Up, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-allies-leave-who-fund
ing-gap-unfilled-as-china-and-others-step-up-11587760407 [https://perma.cc/Q4QX-BA3L].
And, in fact, twice the Chinese delegation in Geneva tried to block the declaration of public
health emergency of international concern. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 44–45. Some note
that WHO was substantially more critical of Tanzania for that country’s failure to report
some Ebola cases the previous year. China Delayed Releasing Coronavirus Info, Frustrating
WHO, ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-healthap-top-news-virus-outbreak-public-health-3c061794970661042b18d5aeaaed9fae
[https://perma.cc/842J-V6SY].
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B. The Thoughtful Process of Understanding the Problem and
Crafting a Strategic Response
Given this SWOT analysis early in the month of January, we
imagine the leadership team would have turned next to drawing in
expertise and farming out key questions and issues for rapid assessment before the press and public inevitably grasped the severity of the problem. Rather than a few top people trying to plan
based on whatever ideas happened to filter up, there would be
working groups systematically trying to get a handle on a wide but
finite set of key issues. The composition and methods of the groups
would be aimed explicitly at harvesting the benefits of transdisciplinarity and reducing the effects of well-recognized professional
and cognitive biases.68 Secretary Azar and his leadership team
would also have to consider how best to support and benefit from
international cooperation. Taking advantage of the opportunity for
significant international cooperation could inform membership on
the working groups, but it went beyond working with WHO and
other nodes on the global health network; it suggested a need to
enlist entities like the Departments of State and Defense, the U.S.
Trade Representative and U.S. Agency for International Development to mobilize diplomatic and financial resources to find common ground (and forestall competition) on travel restrictions, supply chains, and vaccine and medicines development.
The “epidemiology group” would explore the characteristics of
disease transmission and progression. It was obvious at this point
that we were dealing with airborne transmission, but was this really via droplets, aerosols, or both? Spread by droplets, a characteristic of the influenza, happens in close quarters when infected
people cough or sneeze. If the route of transmission was just via
droplets, then keeping physical distance, implementing physical
barriers, and sanitizing hands and surfaces would all have been
necessary and useful measures to reduce spread. Outdoor risks
would not be that different from indoor. If COVID-19 aerosols could
accumulate in still air and hang there for extended periods, as with
tuberculosis, then outdoors would be considerably safer than
68. See, e.g., Timon Forster & Mirko Heinzel, Reacting, Fast and Slow: How World
Leaders Shaped Government Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 28 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y
1299, 1302, 1313 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2021.1942157 [https://perma.cc/9
H7Y-F8SJ]; Jamie K. Wardman, Recalibrating Pandemic Risk Leadership: Thirteen Crisis
Ready Strategies for COVID-19, 23 J. RISK RSCH. 1092, 1112, 1115 (2020), https://doi.org/
10.1080/13669877.2020.1842989 [https://perma.cc/CK6B-94P9] (discussing good leadership
in face of COVID-19).
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indoors, barriers could make transmission worse, ventilation systems would be important risk and preventive factors, and masks
would be an even higher priority.69 It was similarly essential to
confirm, in line with Dr. Fauci’s strong expectation,70 that people
could not produce enough viral material to transmit the virus if
they were not displaying symptoms. Understanding the health effects of the virus was necessary to gauge not just direct morbidity
and mortality but also indirect knock-on harms if a wave of hospitalizations overwhelmed hospitals.
A “public health countermeasures group” would be assigned the
task of working out realistic response options given prevailing conditions. This would require starting with the SWOT findings in
considering whether and how to hold a line (for example, tight border controls and the tracking of people entering the United States)
and what lines might have to be abandoned in an orderly retreat
(for example, if such border countermeasures were infeasible).
Public health orthodoxy71—and international law—took a dim
view on border controls, both for their perceived ineffectiveness
and for their certain social and economic costs, but the underlying
evidence one way or the other was weak,72 and there might be
value in slowing penetration to prepare a response, even for a matter of a week or two. In any case, politicians, not health leaders,
would make the call in many places, including the United States.
Wuhan was showing that rapid community transmission was a
possibility, which meant thinking about changes in daily life that
were unprecedented in modern times. To get close to right answers,
69. Zeynep Tufekci, Why Did It Take So Long to Accept the Facts About Covid?, N.Y.
TIMES (May 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/07/opinion/coronavirus-airbornetransmission.html [https://perma.cc/MVF9-WBW6].
70. On January 28, Anthony Fauci said during a coronavirus task force press conference that, “in all the history of respiratory-borne viruses of any type, asymptomatic transmission has never been the driver of outbreaks . . . Even if there is a rare asymptomatic
person that might transmit, an epidemic is not driven by asymptomatic carriers.” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Update on the New Coronavirus Outbreak First
Identified in Wuhan, China, YOUTUBE, at 41:20 (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=w6koHkBCoNQ [https://perma.cc/Z7N4-PLN4]; see also GOTTLIEB, supra note 8,
at 84.
71. See, e.g., Selam Gebrekidan, Katrin Bennhold, Matt Apuzzo & David D. Kirkpatrick, Ski, Party, Seed a Pandemic: The Travel Rules that Let Covid-19 Take Flight, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/30/world/europe/ski-party-pan
demic-travel-coronavirus.html [perma.cc/Z8SJ-ECN4] (quoting Larry Gostin, a scholar of
global health governance that “[i]t’s part of the religion of global health: Travel and trade
restrictions are bad . . . I’m one of the congregants.”).
72. Id. (explaining how a former senior WHO official felt that “[t]he effect of travel restrictions on the spread of the latest coronavirus is still not understood. . . . ‘Anyone who is
truthful is going to tell you it’s a big fat “We don’t know.’”).
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this group would have to include not only federal and local health
officials, public health lawyers, social and political scientists,
mathematical modelers, and historians with insights into how
large-scale measures had been received and implemented in analogous pandemics, most importantly the 1918–1919 influenza.73
Crimson Contagion pointed to the problem of surging demand
for basic medical supplies. Likewise, testing was a highly likely
need and a vaccine would be indispensable if the disease broke
through. A “medical countermeasures” group would have to start
identifying and preparing for contingencies including the development of tests, vaccines, and treatments. It would also have to find
ways to prevent or alleviate equipment shortages, including via the
use of emergency market powers provided in the Defense Production Act.74
In addition to their specific charges, all three groups would be
asked to use debiasing tools like the Haddon Matrix and causal
modeling, which would help them identify links in or mediators of
the causal chains they were otherwise implicitly constructing, and
to avoid settling too soon on an inferior option.75 Groups would be
encouraged to complete weekly “premortems”—that is, to try to imagine everything that could go wrong based on the SWOT, findings

73. We would certainly want also to include Howard Markel, an authority on the Spanish influenza, who was already warning that the Chinese approach could be a poor model,
writing, “[m]ore often than not, health officials are several steps behind a spreading epidemic. And when they aren’t, the history books show, they tend to act too fast (costing a
fortune) or unfairly (discriminating against some populations).” Howard Markel, Will the
Largest Quarantine in History Just Make Things Worse? The Dirty History Behind Isolating
the Sick, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/opinion/chinawuhan-virus-quarantine.html [perma.cc/3X28-GXQ4]; see, e.g., Alexandra M. Stern, Martin
S. Cetron & Howard Markel, Closing the Schools: Lessons from the 1918–19 U.S. Influenza
Pandemic, 28 HEALTH AFFS. 1066, 1077 (2009), https://doi.org/10.1377/hlthaff.28.6.w1066
[https://perma.cc/5TC7-MLD9]; Howard Markel, Harvey B. Lipman, J. Alexander Navarro,
Alexandra Sloan, Joseph Michalsen, Alexandra Minna Stern & Martin S. Cetron, Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic—Reply,
298 JAMA 2260, 2260–61 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.298.19.2261-a [https://
perma.cc/7KNV-D9FJ]; Howard Markel, Harvey B. Lipman, J. Alexander Navarro, Alexandra Sloan, Joseph Michalsen, Alexandra Minna Stern & Martin S. Cetron, Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic,
298 JAMA 644, 654 (2007), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.298.6.644 [https://perma.cc/ZR3QAQKF].
74. 50 U.S.C. § 4511.
75. Visuals ensure more efficient and effective transdisciplinarity by improving communication within the groups and to society at large. Evan D. Anderson & Scott Burris,
Educated Guessing: Researchers and Research Knowledge into Policy Innovation, in
REGULATING TOBACCO, ALCOHOL AND UNHEALTHY FOODS: THE LEGAL ISSUES (2014);
Ciesielski et al., supra note 25, at 126.

978

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:955

from the other groups, uncertainty, and evolving events.76 Each of
these groups would have a membership of some reasonable number, but each member would be linked in a larger professional network. These groups would have had to be powerfully transdisciplinary, because from the start the question would not just be
whether they would work under some set of ideal conditions
dreamed up in a conference room, but whether they would work in
the real world. Teams had to consider economic costs, enforcement
capacity, political acceptability, scientific plausibility, equity, human frailty—and legality.
All the working groups identified would be deliberately staffed
to be transdisciplinary, but their missions and orientation would
still be likely to bias them towards familiar public health thinking.
For that reason, it would be important to actively foster diverse,
critical, even contrarian thinking. Our version of Secretary Azar
would accomplish this by creating what in some past crises CDC
has called a Team B. This rethinking and brainstorming group
would include critical scientists, academics, and public health and
legal practitioners able to spot potential errors and hidden pitfalls
in the work of the other teams; it would also include ethicists, social justice advocates, (retired) politicians, and community and
business leaders—or decent proxies who could reach these kinds of
people through their networks—to consider equity, tradeoffs of all
kinds, and, perhaps most importantly, whether and to what extent
values other than minimizing COVID-19 morbidity and mortality
needed to be taken into account.77 Such “committees” were already
working outside government. 78

76. This idea was popularized by Daniel Kahneman. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING,
FAST AND SLOW 264–65 (2011) (suggesting that, in all challenging endeavors, it is valuable
to envision that you failed and to identify what went wrong, an example of the slower and
deliberative thinking that Kahneman compares with rapid and instinctual cognition).
77. For an account of the CDC Team B experience, see PAMELA VARLEY, KENNEDY SCH.
OF GOV’T, KEEPING AN OPEN MIND IN AN EMERGENCY: CDC EXPERIMENTS WITH “TEAM B” 2
(2008). An important function of this group would be challenging the view that reducing
morbidity and mortality were indisputably the top priorities and, consequently, pressuring
planners to consider tradeoffs and means of getting buy-in and support from those with
different priorities.
78. Our working groups are imaginary, but in reality, such groups were forming spontaneously all over the internet and across all sorts of disciplines. One of us was involved
with a group of lawyers, epidemiologists, and human rights advocates as early as January
27, 2020. Another included a group that resembled the Team B concept in composition and
practice. The members were infectious disease doctors, health systems experts and managers, and one former local and then state health official. Eric Lipton, The ‘Red Dawn’ Emails:
8 Key Exchanges on the Faltering Response to the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/11/us/politics/coronavirus-red-dawn-emails-trump.html
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Finally, it was reasonably clear that a primary challenge would
be trying to understand the key dimensions of the crisis while having to respond to a deluge of demands for daily action and information. The working groups had to have the best and most experienced people, and they could not also be the people leading initial
operations (like dealing with cruise ship outbreaks) or prepping
and doing meetings and press briefings. This required at least
three things: (1) segregating operations and planning responsibilities, (2) establishing a “press secretariat” team that would deal
with the media and coordinate with the White House communications team, and (3) keeping the message honest—sharing what
facts were known but making clear that, for the moment, the
health team was going to focus on analysis and planning. For now,
public attention was still elsewhere, and the best message was the
truth: we are working 24/7 to understand this threat and what we
should do about it.
C. Integrating the Increasing Flow of Information
By the time the committees got to work in mid-January, they
would face a strengthening torrent of information. WHO was still
suggesting that there was “no clear evidence of human-to-human
transmission,”79 yet cases were appearing across the globe.80 On
January 20, the United States would identify its first, a man in

[https://perma.cc/J63L-RQU2]. The group nicknamed itself the Wolverines, which was the
group of rebels that fought against a Russian invasion in the campy 1984 movie “Red Dawn.”
Id.; see also RED DAWN (United Artists & Valkyrie Films 1984). The group started with a
half dozen members led by Carter Mecher, chief medical advisor to the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs, who had overturned conventional thinking about pandemic control in 2004
with a reanalysis of 1918 pandemic controls, which was subsequently validated by historians like Howard Markel and infectious disease modelers like Marc Lipsitch. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 187–89. The Red Dawn email chain grew during the spring of 2020 and would
eventually include Anthony Fauci, Robert Kadlec, Jerome Adams, and others. See Lipton,
supra. A large cache of the Red Dawn emails was published by the New York Times. Id.
[hereinafter ‘Red Dawn’ Emails], https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6879-2020-covid19-red-dawn-rising/66f590d5cd41e11bea0f/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/US
2D-G26E] (scroll to “See all of the email exchanges” and click “more than 80 pages of these
emails”).
79. On January 14, 2020, WHO tweeted, “Preliminary investigations conducted by the
Chinese authorities have found no clear evidence of human-to-human transmission of the
novel #coronavirus (2019-nCoV) identified in #Wuhan, #China.” World Health Organization
(@WHO), TWITTER (Jan. 14, 2020, 6:18 AM), https://twitter.com/WHO/status/12170
43229427761152 [https://perma.cc/9GL8-CTXU].
80. WORLD HEALTH ORG., NOVEL CORONAVIRUS (2019-NCOV) SITUATION REPORT - 1, 21
JANUARY 2020 (2020), https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/situation-re
ports/20200121-sitrep-1-2019-ncov.pdf?sfvrsn=20a99c10_4 [https://perma.cc/LR9K-4MKY].
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Washington State recently returned from Wuhan.81 Three days
later, China would shut down Wuhan to all travel.82 The 10,000
cases confirmed there by the end of the month would remove any
doubt that person-to-person transmission was occurring.83 Exploring the mechanics of disease transmission and progression would
still be difficult in late January, but then came data from cruise
ship outbreaks. After 3,700 passengers and crew on the Diamond
Princess were quarantined and tested in mid-February, the epidemiology group would have access to four important findings: 328 of
the 634 confirmed cases onboard were asymptomatic, a number of
staff and quarantine officers became infected, the infection fatality
rate was two percent, and there appeared to be substantial spread
after passengers were quarantined in their rooms, which Japanese
health officials interpreted as clear evidence of aerosol transmission.84 Members of the group would know that the first SARS epidemic had been fueled by aerosol transmission, and that CDC experts had been slow to accept that evidence. If the epidemiology
group did not remember this, Team B would certainly remind
them.85

81. Michelle L. Holshue et al., First Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus in the United
States, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 929, 929–30 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa2001191
[https://perma.cc/P3V4-HFJ8].
82. See Amy Qin & Vivian Wang, Wuhan, Center of Coronavirus Outbreak, Is Being Cut
off by Chinese Authorities, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
01/22/world/asia/china-coronavirus-travel.html [https://perma.cc/P9G6-3TXX].
83. See James Griffiths & Nicole Chavez, Coronavirus Death Toll Rises to 258 as US
and Others Impose Strict Travel Restrictions, CNN (Jan. 31, 2020, 7:51 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2020/01/30/asia/wuhan-coronavirus-update-intl-hnk/index.html [https://per
ma.cc/XG2Z-AHDS].
84. See Kenji Mizumoto, Katshushi Kagaya, Alexander Zarebski & Gerardo Chowell,
Estimating the Asymptomatic Proportion of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Cases
on Board the Diamond Princess Cruise Ship, Yokohama, Japan, 2020, EUROSURVEILLANCE,
Mar. 12, 2020, at 1, 4, https://doi.org/10.2807%2F1560-7917.ES.2020.25.10.2000180 [htt
ps://perma.cc/6FAS-VVQ7].
85. See VARLEY, supra note 77, at 9. The implication is not that, by this point, the teams
should have accepted that aerosol spread was definitely an important factor in pandemic
spread; there were reasons to question that proposition. See Michael Klompas, Meghan A.
Baker & Chanu Rhee, Airborne Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 Theoretical Considerations
and Available Evidence, 324 JAMA 441, 441 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.2020.
12458 [https://perma.cc/3KP7-NFRP]. Rather, our point is that the group had enough evidence that it should have assumed both airborne and asymptomatic spread. We are, moreover, persuaded by researchers like Trisha Greenhalgh and Zeynep Tufekci that bias rather
than evidence was the primary driver of the mistake and the delay in recognizing it. See
Trisha Greenhalgh, Miasmas, Mental Models and Preventive Public Health: Some Philosophical Reflections on Science in the COVID-19 Pandemic, INTERFACE FOCUS, Dec. 6, 2021,
at 3, 5, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsfs.2021.0017 [https://perma.cc/8JPE-2D7X]; Trisha Greenhalgh, M. Ozibilgin & D. Tomlinson, How Covid-19 Spreads: Narratives, Counter-Narratives
and Social Dramas, AUTHOREA (2021), https://doi.org/10.22541/au.163709155.56570215/v1
[https://perma.cc/S6VP-9KYS]; Tufekci, supra note 69.
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The epidemiology group would have the opportunity to confirm
and extend these findings and explore domestic penetration of virus a few weeks later. An infectious disease researcher in Seattle
had been collecting thousands of nasal samples to track seasonal
influenza since January. Her research team had the capacity to
check those samples for COVID-19.86 After obtaining rapid CDC
approval, that team would reveal that a little more than one percent of this accidental sample tested positive, including some specimens dating back to late January.87 There would be no denying
that the virus was spreading undetected in the Northwest. Just a
few weeks after that, CDC researchers would test all residents of
a skilled nursing facility in Seattle after a nurse appeared to have
carried the virus from one facility to another.88 The findings—rapid
spread among bedbound patients, half of whom had no symptoms
but viral loads capable of transmission—would add to accumulating evidence for asymptomatic and airborne transmission.89
By this point, the severity of the epidemic would have been clear,
and experienced state and local public health officials in the public
health countermeasures group would be warning that traditional
case finding and control methods were just not going to be feasible
given the condition of U.S. public health human and data infrastructure. Devising workable measures would be extra-challenging
now that the disconnect between the working groups and Trump’s
inner circle would already be emerging. On January 31, the Trump
administration had prohibited travel into the United States by foreign nationals who had traveled to China in the past fourteen days,
with exceptions for immediate family members of U.S. citizens or

86. Sheri Fink & Mike Baker, ‘It’s Just Everywhere Already’: How Delays in Testing Set
Back the U.S. Coronavirus Response, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/03/10/us/coronavirus-testing-delays.html [https://perma.cc/7TFN-T3YY];
see GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 89.
87. Helen Y. Chu et al., Early Detection of Covid-19 Through a Citywide Pandemic Surveillance Platform, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 185, 185–87 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1056/
nejmc2008646 [https://perma.cc/DC5C-DFZC].
88. Anne Kimball et al., Asymptomatic and Presymptomatic SARS-CoV-2 Infections in
Residents of a Long-Term Care Skilled Nursing Facility — King County, Washington, March
2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 377, 378 (2020), https://doi.org/10.15585/
mmwr.mm6913e1 [https://perma.cc/83MQ-E56S].
89. See id.; Camilla Rothe et al., Transmission of 2019-nCoV Infection from an Asymptomatic Contact in Germany, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 970, 970–71 (2020), https://
doi.org/10.1056/NEJMc2001468 [https://perma.cc/Y59G-YUHV] (reporting an incident of
asymptomatic spread in a paper published March 5, 2020); Yan Bai, Lingsheng Yao, Tao
Wei, Fei Tian, Dong-Yan Jin, Lijuan Chen & Meiyun Wang, Presumed Asymptomatic Carrier Transmission of COVID-19, 323 JAMA 1406, 1406–07 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1001/
jama.2020.2565 [https://perma.cc/U33T-4BC6].
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permanent residents.90 This meant that, in theory, CDC and state
health officials would be managing some 40,000 returnees from
China over the next two months.91 CDC and state agency partners
were not going to be able to do this properly, given the lack of capacity, and in any case, it was not going to do a thing about people
coming via other countries where cases were now spreading, as
documented by a publicized case in Nigeria resulting from transmission in Italy.92
With signs that contact tracing and isolation were already infeasible, it would be urgent to rapidly map out and assess a list of
possible fallback measures with their strengths and drawbacks. At
this point, we imagine the countermeasures group reporting back
that it had already broken into a dozen subcommittees, all tasked
with developing short, medium, and long-term intervention strategies for an extended 1918–1919 scale pandemic. The focus of these
subgroups would include:
● Engineering

interventions to make enclosed spaces safer, with
a particular focus on prisons, care facilities, and schools;
Twenty-first century strategies for case finding and tracking,
including rapid testing and apps;
●

Surveillance strategies for tracking genetic changes in the virus;
●

● Measures

to reduce close physical interaction, including closure
or density limits for gathering places;
Emergency measures for vulnerable congregate settings like
prisons and nursing homes;
●

Measures to reduce transmission in primary, secondary, and
tertiary education;
●

90. Proclamation on Suspension of Entry as Immigrants and Nonimmigrants of Persons
Who Pose a Risk of Transmitting 2019 Novel Coronavirus, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE (Jan.
31, 2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-suspen
sion-entry-immigrants-nonimmigrants-persons-pose-risk-transmitting-2019-novel-coronav
irus [https://perma.cc/G4WY-X792].
91. Steve Eder, Henry Fountain, Michael H. Keller, Muyi Xiao & Alexandra Stevenson,
430,000 People Have Traveled from China to U.S. Since Coronavirus Surfaced, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/04/us/coronavirus-china-travel-restric
tions.html [https://perma.cc/MB9T-QGP3].
92. Ruth Maclean & Abdi Latif Dahir, Nigeria Responds to First Coronavirus Case in
Sub-Saharan Africa, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/28/
world/africa/nigeria-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/XFC4-EURC].
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● Masks;
● Protection

of workers who could not socially distance; and

Trigger points for titrating countermeasures based on local
community spread and health system capacity.93
●

Each subgroup would also identify and develop solutions for
practical and legal challenges and assessing the balance and distribution of potential benefits and costs.
The medical and pharmaceutical working group surely would
have confirmed that the supply situation was dire as soon as it took
a careful look and saw that no one in HHS seemed to know what
to do about it. Fortunately, the group would have already recruited
supply chain experts and secured the services of a Pentagon executive closely familiar with procurement and market management
under the Defense Production Act.94 With any sort of spike in demand, there were quickly going to be shortages in personal protective equipment (“PPE”) like masks, respirators, and gowns.95 If, as
should be assumed, there would be a sharp increase in demand for
ventilators associated with a high incidence of severe respiratory
illness, intensive care units would fill, and there would immediately be shortages. The key parameters on these supplies were
clear:
There was little to no visibility into the available stock of essential materials in hospitals and other healthcare entities;
●

● Most

production was overseas, and restocking was on a just-intime basis leaving very little surplus for spikes;
Border closures, outbreaks in port or manufacturing centers,
and holdbacks by host countries could all affect current contracts
and make it difficult or impossible to increase imports;
●

93. For narrative simplicity, we are not diving into the many issues specific to health
care, but all the work we imagine for control efforts would be indicated for healthcare too.
94. 50 U.S.C. § 4511.
95. Dareh Gregorian, Ousted Whistleblower Dr. Rick Bright Unloads on Trump Admin’s
Coronavirus Response, NBC NEWS (May 14, 2020, 5:46 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/pol
itics/congress/coronavirus-whistleblower-bright-issues-stark-vaccine-warning-we-don-t-n1
207056 [https://perma.cc/GE9D-PUZ2] (noting that Rick Bright warned of impending PPE
shortages in January and was dismissed); Aaron Rupar, Trump Said “Nobody Could Have
Predicted” Coronavirus. White House Memos Show His Advisers Did, VOX (Apr. 7, 2020,
11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/4/7/21211845/trump-coronavirus-memos-predicted
[https://perma.cc/D2VE-MYEL] (describing Peter Navarro’s memo to President Trump in
mid-February predicting massive shortages of PPE).
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● Spikes

would be localized at first, as the virus spread out from
affected communities, but hoarding by health systems (and citizens, in the case of masks) would be likely;
Domestic manufacturing capacity could be mobilized, but it
would take time and purchase guarantees because companies had
been burned by scaling up production in previous outbreaks of disease; and
●

FDA would have to work quickly and effectively in vetting a
surge of production from new producers and methods, and counterfeiting could undermine safety.
●

The group would already be at work mobilizing staff at HHS
and reaching out to industry and trade groups to rapidly acquire
better situational awareness and develop plans, with the understanding that markets are especially likely to fail when there is the
type of uncertainty that a pandemic presents.
The development, rapid production, and distribution of tests
would be highly advantageous, if not essential, for many control
strategies. WHO had released a protocol for a PCR assay test in
mid-January.96 CDC had gone ahead and produced its own test,
but by the end of January, it was already clear there was something wrong with it.97 Even if they could be made to work, some
strategies would call for tens of millions of cheap, readily available
test kits that individuals and organizations could use to manage
their risks, which CDC-affiliated laboratories could never hope to
produce even though such tests did not have to be highly sophisticated tools. Hence a subcommittee would be working to mobilize
and coordinate with private industry, WHO, and partner countries
to identify the best candidates and move them into production. The
96. Listings of WHO’s Response to COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 29,
2021), https://www.who.int/news/item/29-06-2020-covidtimeline [https://perma.cc/JCD9-AX
B3] (“13 January 2020 . . . . WHO publishes first protocol for a RT-PCR assay by a WHO
partner laboratory to diagnose the novel coronavirus.”). About the same time, a Harvard
scientist got to work on a rapid test that was ready for FDA review by mid-March. See Lydia
DePillis, This Scientist Created a Rapid Test Just Weeks into the Pandemic. Here’s Why You
Still Can’t Get It, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 21, 2021, 5:00 PM), https://www.propublica.org/art
icle/this-scientist-created-a-rapid-test-just-weeks-into-the-pandemic-heres-why-you-still-ca
nt-get-it [https://perma.cc/JN27-9MPJ]. It had relatively low sensitivity—that is, it might
miss cases—but, as Rochelle Walensky would soon be arguing in her research, see Paltiel &
Walensky, supra note 50, it was the sort of cheap, fast test that could identify infectious
people and prevent transmission events. FDA declined to approve it and other similar tests.
DePillis, supra.
97. What We Know About Delays in Coronavirus Testing, WASH. POST (Apr. 18,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2020/04/18/timeline-coronavirus-tes
ting [https://perma.cc/6F7G-JVHA].
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committee would emphasize that global level cooperation was both
expeditious and smart because control had to be global to succeed.
The subcommittee on testing would include intellectual property
(“IP”) lawyers and Pentagon staffers familiar with invoking the
powers under the Defense Production Act to issue emergency contracts, grants, and loans.98
A subcommittee on vaccines would be operating on much the
same basis and types of expertise. Strong vaccine candidates had
been created just days after the viral genome was posted in early
January, and those vaccine candidates were already in human trials.99 It would take enormous investments to develop, manufacture, and distribute a vaccine, but this vaccine would be sold in the
billions of doses to a desperate world, a fact that presented an attractive prospect to commercial pharma. Billions of sales were a
useful incentive, but government funds would be needed and used
for research and development, and advance contracts would be essential. The committee members would stress the opportunity to
use funding or deals to ensure that intellectual property, including
production techniques as well as the vaccine themselves, would be
rapidly transferred to lower-income countries to ensure that the
vaccine could reach across the globe. This would be important not
just from an equity point of view (as the ethics/justice/contrarian
committee would already be arguing) but from the most practical
perspective of pandemic control. If swaths of the globe remained
unvaccinated, the virus would spread and mutate and then
threaten immunized masses anew. Departments of State and Commerce would be coordinating high-level diplomatic efforts to develop agreement on aid and IP for the global deployment of vaccines and maintain supply lines.
Team B would also be weighing in. They would be studying early
outbreak data and making practical analogies from cruise ships to
congregate care facilities and hospitals.100 They would make crude
but effective comparisons between the number of cases disclosed
98. See 50 U.S.C. § 4511.
99. Charles Schmidt, Genetic Engineering Could Make a COVID-19 Vaccine in Months
Rather than Years, SCI. AM (June 1, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ge
netic-engineering-could-make-a-covid-19-vaccine-in-months-rather-than-years1/# [https://
perma.cc/D2Z8-QFWC].
100. See infra note 141, noting that Carter Mecher immediately realized that the Princess Diamond provided a preview of how COVID would rapidly spread in nursing homes
and hospitals without drastic infection control procedures. His experiencing managing Veterans Affairs systems—and specifically reducing medical error—would be indispensable to
the practical need to reshape clinical and residential settings to slow transmission.
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by China in previous epidemics and COVID-19 data to determine
a more realistic ascertainment rate. They would have a mathematical modeler working closely with people who had deep substantive
knowledge of infectious disease and public health practice.101 This
team would quickly challenge orthodoxy around asymptomatic
transmission and widespread seeding of the virus. They would
have raised the uncomfortable reality that absence of evidence that
the virus was spreading—for lack of testing—was not evidence of
its absence.102 They would have pushed a prioritization of efforts
and hard truths about limitations based on facts on the ground.103
This team would have also warned other officials of a looming
health equity disaster centering on prisoners, the elderly, essential
workers, and the undocumented. They would have been empowered to ensure that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, CMS, state nursing home regulators, and prison officials
were engaged in developing plans and guidelines.104 They would
have been far ahead of the curve in thinking about the

101. See ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (email from Carter Mecher, Senior Med. Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 18, 2020, 1:32 PM)) (discussing in detail how to shift the
structure of inpatient and outpatient care in anticipation of a surge of hospitalizations).
102. See ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting email from James V. Lawler, Infectious Disease Dr., Univ. of Nebraska (Mar. 13, 2020, 6:30 PM)) (“CDC is really missing the
mark here. By the time you have ‘substantial community transmission’ it is too late. It’s like
ignoring the smoke detector and waiting until your entire house is on fire to call the fire
dept. Plus, how are you supposed to know when you have community transmission when
they haven’t been able to provide a diagnostic assay that can be used widely and at high
volume?”).
103. See ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting email from Carter Mecher, Senior
Med. Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:15 PM)) (“I think we are getting close
to the point where we need to drop those things that are not critical and focus on the most
important things. We are going to have a devil of time with lab confirmation—it is just too
slow (they had a 2 day turnaround on the cruise ship) and we just don’t have the capacity
for the volume of tests we would anticipate. Charity [Dean, the state public health officer,]
has stressed this point again and again.”).
104. See ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting emails from Carter Mecher, Senior
Med. Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 20, 2020, 6:39 AM)) (“The 2,666 passengers are
similar in age (and likely in co-morbidities) to the population we see in a nursing home or
residential care facility. The 1,045 crew are a proxy for a young healthy population. It will
be important to look at the outcomes separately. One of the concerns is how a ‘remake of
this movie’ could play out in similarly confined populations of elderly frail Americans. Here
are the numbers of long-term care facilities/programs in the US that care for the frail elderly
[omitted]. A large number of locations and a large number of residents/participants. I know
that healthcare leaders were engaged yesterday, is anyone engaging this sector (long term
care)? The healthcare leaders seemed more concerned about critical supply shortages (akin
to the IV fluid shortage). Listening to them, it felt like their concerns seemed almost divorced from the threat of COVID.”).

2022]

A BETTER RESPONSE TO COVID-19

987

practicalities of school closure and the counterarguments that
might have emerged when vigorous action was proposed.105
D. The Response Framework
Having started in mid-January, committees would have been delivering findings and proposing detailed action plans as early as
mid-February. It would have been the job of the leadership core to
work with teams to refine their understandings of the problems, to
consider logistics, tradeoffs, and limitations of candidate solutions,
and to begin to lay out plans on the calendar—short term (Spring
2020), medium-term (Summer) and long-term (Fall 2020 and beyond). By mid-February, even before short-term plans could have
been worked out and readied for implementation, countermeasures subcommittees would have prepared detailed guidelines and
drafted emergency declarations and regulations to prevent transmission in prisons, nursing homes, and other congregate care settings. These regulations could have been a starting point for state
and local authorities. As the first significant control measures coming from the federal government, these guidelines or rules would
have had to make clear that we were facing a virus as transmissible as a cold or influenza but much more deadly because it can
spread rapidly in crowded congregate settings and be especially
dangerous to older and less healthy people.
Given that President Trump had gone ahead and ended travel
from China and the cruise ship debacles were already making plain
the limited operational capacity of CDC, the launch of emergency
guidance for congregate settings would have been a big chance to
bolster credibility and prepare the public for what was likely to
come. Based on what was known at the time, and assuming that
working groups had made progress over the previous three to four
weeks in testing, epidemiology, engineering, and anticipating
105. See ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting email from Carter Mecher, Senior
Med. Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 17, 2020, 8:57 AM)) (“[National Provider Identifiers] are going to be central to our response to this outbreak (assuming our estimates of
severity prove accurate). This email group has grown since we began (not quite epidemic
level growth, but getting there). Looking ahead, I anticipate we might encounter pushback
over the implementation of [National Provider Identifiers] and would expect similar concerns/arguments as were raised back in 2006 when this strategy first emerged. It was one
of the reasons shared the updated data on US households from American Community Survey, data on USDA programs for nutritional support (including school meal programs), data
on schools and enrollment, and even data on juvenile crime. The data that was gathered
back in 2006 on social density in various environments (homes offices/workplaces, schools,
daycare, etc., is unchanged).”).
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objections and tradeoffs, federal emergency action on congregate
settings would have introduced the idea of layered protections, defined and explained triggers for action based on evidence of spread
and availability of supplies, and assumed symptomatic airborne
transmission. They could have included:
● Mask

requirements for staff and residents, subject to guidance
and work on procurement;
● Requirements
● Infection

and protocols for staff and resident testing;

management guidelines;

Measures to limit employees from working in more than one
setting or working sick, including initial measures for “paycheck
protection” and sick leave;
●

● Guidance

on visiting, taking into consideration the harm to residents of complete visitor bans and integrating marking, testing,
outdoor settings, and engineering controls as they became available; and
● Rapid

ers.106

decarceration of nondangerous and nonconvicted prison-

The federal government had some authority to implement these
regulations for the federal prison system and long-term care settings through CMS leverage over funding. But the value of the federal effort would have been tested—and magnified—in the degree
to which it provided clear, concrete, and specific guidance (and
even model regulations or emergency orders) for state and local
governments.107 As we hit early March, local and state governments were already searching for guidance, and the stock market
was getting jittery. It would be time to build all that had come out
of the working group process and transform it into a far-seeing
106. See Jessica Bresler & Leo Beletsky, COVID-19, Incarceration, and the Criminal Legal System, in ASSESSING LEGAL RESPONSES TO COVID-19 228, 229–32 (Scott Burris, Sarah
de Guia, Lance Gable, Donna E. Levin, Wendy E. Parmet & Nicolas A. Terry eds., 2020);
Rossana Lau-Ng, Lisa B. Caruso & Thomas T. Perls, COVID-19 Deaths in Long-Term Care
Facilities: A Critical Piece of the Pandemic Puzzle, 68 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 1895, 1896–
97 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1111/jgs.16669 [https://perma.cc/75S8-WEHB].
107. CDC’s Public Health Law Program could have been enlisted to draft model orders
and declarations, and we hope the lawyers would have pushed and helped the working
groups to identify and package best evidence and reasoning to provide support for the steps
if they were challenged in court. In the Jacobsonian model of public health law that prevailed at the outset of the epidemic, the judgments of public health officials were owed substantial deference – but deference depended ultimately on a showing that the facts were
present and that the inferences were strong to show the necessity of the challenged
measures.
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framework populated by conscious, plausible choices and designed
to guide both governments and citizens through the coming disaster. There would be at least five short-term aims in the framework:
1. Manufacture, distribution, and deployment of tests for rapid,
widespread, and low-threshold testing;
2. Targeted distancing and density restrictions tied to sentinel
evidence of local spread;
3. Universal masking in indoor settings in areas of local spread
and interstate transportation;
4. Urgent production and collaborative management of scarce
resources like masks and ventilators; and
5. A durable public explanatory approach for a response that
would evolve in response to new information and experience.
The medium range activity in the framework would have attempted to reorganize life to reduce transmission in the least disruptive and inequitable ways and would have pursued global cooperation around immediate resource needs. This would have
included:
1. Early planning and implementation, to the extent possible,
of strategies to ensure that schools and restaurants could soon reopen either outside or with better airflow engineering;
2. Identification of social and economic measures necessary to
address economic effects and support compliance with control
measures;108
3. Enhanced worker protections (like an emergency temporary
standard);109
4. Creation of a joint task force between NIH and the National
Science Foundation, which would be charged with mounting a coordinated research response to identifying important questions,

108. As we did with health care, we limit discussion of this crucial topic for narrative
simplicity. We fully share the view of the importance of these questions in the response—
and the need for ensuring that economics expertise is part of the transdisciplinary practice
of public health. See Michael E. Darden et al., Modeling to Inform Economy-Wide Pandemic
Policy: Bringing Epidemiologists and Economists Together (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch.,
Working Paper No. 29475, 2021).
109. SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND COVID19, at 4 (2021).
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coordinate and fund teams to fill needs, and systematically review
findings before publication policy and avoid panic or confusion; and
5. Global leadership to develop a resilient multinode system for
production and distribution of a limited number of the most essential supplies, including masks and vaccine and test components.
The long-range planning would focus on three primary aims:
1. Development and delivery of vaccines and treatments
through processes designed for global access;
2. Preservation of social and, as necessary, legal capital to promote ongoing public, political, and judicial acceptance of targeted,
layered prevention measures and, eventually, rapid and near universal uptake of vaccines; and
3. Clear guidelines explaining the transition from the acute
phase of the pandemic to an endemic pattern.110
All of these aims would be provisional, and each would be communicated with an honest appraisal of their justification as well as
underlying uncertainty.
II. ATTRIBUTES OF A SUCCESSFUL RESPONSE: DEFINING
PROBLEMS, CONSIDERING CONTEXT, AND USING TIME
We described an imaginary process calculated to produce better
judgements under uncertainty. Starting with a clear-eyed assessment of response capacities (the SWOT analysis), the process
turned to efforts to define the problem. Without reveling in hindsight or claiming that our foresight was any better than average,111
we think that a properly diverse group of actors using common decision-making tools would have reached certain key judgements
sooner. These include, chiefly, the assumption of asymptomatic
110. There was little attempt to stimulate and curate a better discourse about the pandemic by promoting more accurate and meaningful terms. The “flatten the curve” phrase
became problematic. See Dylan Scott, Flattening the Curve Worked—Until It Didn’t, VOX
(Dec. 31, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/22180261/covid-19-coronavirus-social-dist
ancing-lockdowns-flatten-the-curve [https://perma.cc/3NU7-NVV2] (noting that the phrase
“flatten the curve” had a catchy and intuitive appeal early in the pandemic but quickly lost
salience and meaning as the acute early phase ended). The public discourse around airborne
transmission was perhaps even worse creating confusion among the public which almost
surely undermined efforts to implement control measures.
111. In fact, we two authors were blinkered by our roles as lawyers. We saw some things
early, like the risks to essential workers and people in congregate settings, and anticipated
massive enforcement problems, but we did not question CDC on modes of transmission or
the need for masks.
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and aerosol transmission; the early infeasibility of individual case
finding and control measures; the imperative need for cheap, massproducible and accurate tests; the urgent risk to congregate settings; the dire state of key medical supplies; the need for deep and
broad international cooperation on supplies, vaccines, pharmaceuticals and control strategies; the threat that risks and burdens
would be distributed inequitably; and the need for a narrative that
would respect the public’s intelligence and prepare it for an evolving response. We think this list is reasonable, not least because
there were some people who saw these things at the time.
Problems define solutions, but the process we imagined works to
pace problem solving by demanding attention to context in a broad
sense. In a diverse group operating from many different perspectives, saving lives would not be allowed to trump other concerns as
a transcendent value. Tradeoffs—from the elderly losing family
contact112 to massive economic distress in service industries—
would have to be considered not just as contingencies in a public
health response but as distinct claims of value beyond maximizing
life. This would be especially true if the process tamped down optimism bias and forced decisionmakers to truly confront a pandemic
that probably would not disappear any time soon. Similarly, the
complexity of humans and societies would have to be accepted as
unavoidable aspects of the problem. In this, as in virtually all preceding pandemics in the United States, not everyone would buy
into any or all of the control measures or afford government health
officials and political leaders an inexhaustible trust account. In
this, as in most instances, merely issuing an order would not guarantee compliance. Blunting deadly surges would soon require distancing and density restrictions, which are difficult for large segments of the population to implement, and the endgame would
require people to take vaccines. All these considerations urge the
judicious use of coercion and careful stewardship of the scarce resources of bandwidth, authority, and credibility.
Recognizing scarcity113 and the reasonable likelihood of humans
behaving like humans leads to the final key step to responding
112. For some, concern about the physiological effects of the virus were far exceeded by
psychological and social concerns including the prospect of dying alone or being estranged
from loved ones. See, e.g., John Leland, At 89, She Fears Dying Alone More than the Coronavirus Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/07/nyregion/dy
ing-alone-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/WSA7-P7AT] (providing an example of an elderly woman who experienced the fears discussed).
113. We note that recognition of scarcity and thoughtful stewardship of scarce resources
are key principles in public health practice: “Virtually every public health action,
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strategically: using time effectively.114 Not only are there limits to
what can be done fast, but staging responses strategically is a way
to overcome initial opposition, strengthen future actions by present
learning, and devise a long-term communications approach. An important moment in our imaginary process would have come when
the groups accepted the high likelihood that asymptomatic community spread could be out of control by as early as February, and
that COVID-19 was going to be an extended problem that required
responsive, robust, and sustainable action, not desperate Hail
Mary passes.
The policies that came out of our imaginary process would have
avoided some of the worst mistakes of the real thing. Early and
vigorous action to protect nursing home patients and prisoners;
triggering of organized procurement and distribution of supplies in
February or early March; the rapid adoption and deployment of
tests fit for multiple purposes,115 along with the steady adaption of
particularly those for which difficult ethical judgments must be made, involves the use of
scarce resources such as human skill, talent, and time; medical equipment and supplies or
other infrastructure; natural resources; and funds that could be directed to other activities.
Even if permissible and effective on its own terms, ethical decision making requires consideration of whether a given action merits expenditure of resources in relation to other needs
or health goals that require attention now or in the foreseeable future.” AM. PUB. HEALTH
ASS’N, PUBLIC HEALTH CODE OF ETHICS 9 (2019).
114. The one overarching theme in the Red Dawn emails was that the response was too
slow. ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting email from James V. Lawler, Infectious
Disease Dr., Univ. of Neb. (Mar. 13, 2020, 6:30 PM)) (“CDC is really missing the mark here.
By the time you have ‘substantial community transmission’ it is too late. It’s like ignoring
the smoke detector and waiting until your entire house is on fire to call the fire dept.”); ‘Red
Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting email from Carter E. Mecher, Senior Med. Advisor,
Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 20, 2020, 7:15 AM)) (“I’m not sure that folks understand what
is just over the horizon. Remember the story about Mann Gulch? We are at the equivalent
of about 5:44. I anticipate that when we reach 5:45, there is going to be chaos and panic to
get anything in place.”); ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 78 (quoting email from Carter E.
Mecher, Senior Med. Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 27, 2020, 5:00 AM)) (“[T]he outbreak has had a good head start. That would suggest we already have a significant outbreak
and are well behind the curve. We are now well past the equivalent 5:45 moment at Mann
Gulch. You can’t outrun it.”); ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 77 (quoting email from Carter
E. Mecher, Senior Med. Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Mar. 12, 2020, 12:38 AM)) (“There
is no value to these travel restrictions. A waste of time and energy. The lesson from Mann
Gulch was to drop those things that are not essential. That lesson was not heeded. I wouldn’t
waste a moment of time on travel restrictions or travel screening. We have nearly as much
disease here in the US as the countries in Europe. [With respect to] community mitigation,
I think we ran out of time for Seattle. But there are other cities and communities where we
still can make a difference. I don’t understand why California and NYC are not acting more
aggressively. Time to focus on other parts of the country where mitigation measures might
still work and where governors, mayors and public health officials are more receptive to
doing what works.”).
115. We would need a rapid home test to spot infectiousness, highly reliable (PCR) antigen tests for reliable diagnoses, and tests that would detect the emergence of new variants.
CDC’s fancy test, even had it worked, would not have met all these needs.
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testing to reducing transmission risk in society; and a strong, multilateral effort to negotiate vaccine contracts that included technology transfer, patent waiver, and licensing or procurement terms to
ensure supplies throughout the world. It also follows that our planners would have done their best to forestall the premature, inefficient, and hugely expensive nationwide shutdown of Spring
2020.116 And a longer timeframe prompts more investment in meeting future needs; even if schools had to be closed in some places in
Spring 2020, we had a good six months to devise and implement
safer school ventilation schemes to allow opening sometime in the
fall.
A real version of what we imagined might have come up with
better or worse ideas. Neither ours nor theirs would be perfect or
complete. On the contrary, they would have been first best guesses
subject to continuous updating and adaptation during the pandemic. Triggers for physical distancing measures, for example,
would have been crude with few tests and a fledgling surveillance
operation; and would have been (transparently) updated as better
surveillance, new variants, and then vaccines came online. The
judgments would have been better because they would have
avoided mistakes and the process would have required more explicit discussion of what was really happening, tradeoffs, and different perspectives.
III. WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED (AND WHAT IT TELLS US)
On January 11, 2020,117 after China reported its first pandemic
death, Azar did indeed convene a task force, which included Anthony Fauci, Robert Redfield, and Robert Kadlec.118 This was not
exactly the broad-based group of diverse talents we imagined in
our story. The task force did not and would not include FDA, NIH,
or CMS representatives for weeks despite the obvious importance
of their agencies. The staffer Azar initially assigned to coordinate

116. The wave of shutdowns in Spring 2021 was launched by state and local officials
using their legal powers and were not strictly subject to any federal authority to allow or
forbid these shutdowns. But they were an expression of public and policymaker panic, not
the implementation of a sensible strategy. Shutdowns happened in places with acute outbreaks, but also places where the wave had yet to hit, and in many places their end was
triggered by political backlash and public exhaustion. We believe a clearer, more detailed,
and credible plan from the federal government could have guided action that was more nuanced in terms of what was done where and when than what we saw in real life.
117. SLAVITT, supra note 5, at 83.
118. Id.
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the response for HHS—and “[e]veryone had to report up through
him”—had no relevant experience, having spent the four previous
years breeding expensive labradoodles.119 It was this staffer, according to reports, who decided not to include the FDA commissioner.120 This individual was replaced in March by Robert Kadlec
who spent almost all of his time on repatriating Americans from
abroad (which interested him as a former Air Force officer)121 and,
by multiple accounts, ignored—actually, suppressed—urgent calls
to focus on foreseeable PPE supply shortages.122
On January 17, the German scientists who developed a test for
SARS and MERS published a reliable method for identifying the
novel coronavirus.123 CDC announced their own test—a more complex multicomponent assay—days later and quickly started producing test kits.124 On February 4, Azar invoked emergencies powers, available pursuant to his declaration of a public health
emergency days earlier,125 to allow expedited deployment of tests
and vaccines through emergency use authorizations. While this
had obvious benefits, it also had an important cost: now all tests
for the virus would need to go through that process, including those

119. Aram Roston & Marisa Taylor, Special Report: Former Labradoodle Breeder Was
Tapped to Lead U.S. Pandemic Task Force, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2020, 5:23 PM), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-hhschief-speci/special-report-former-la
bradoodle-breeder-was-tapped-to-lead-u-s-pandemic-task-force-idUSKCN2243CE [https://
perma.cc/P2AV-AVNF].
120. Id.
121. “During January and February 2020, the HHS leadership was mostly preoccupied
with the travel restrictions and repatriating Americans from other nations.” GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 278. Politico confirmed this perspective after speaking with Trump administration officials. Dan Diamond, Colleagues Paint a Mixed Picture of Ousted Vaccine Chief,
POLITICO (May 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/13/rick-brightvaccine-chief-coronavirus-254127 [https://perma.cc/TG7Z-QDSV] (“Three current officials
said that the emergency division — known as the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, or ASPR — missed planning opportunities in January, February
and March. Instead, Kadlec and other top officials focused on evacuating Americans from
coronavirus-infested cruise ships and bringing hundreds of others back from China — missions that strained the team and did little to prepare for the looming pandemic.”).
122. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, ‘Lives Were Lost’ as Warnings Went Unheeded, Whistle-Blower
Tells House, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/us/politics/whistle-blower-coronavirus-trump.html [https://perma.cc/S7V5-RTEP] (noting that the
ASPR Secretary not only ignored BARDA head Rick Bright’s warnings but fired him later
that spring).
123. Global Biodefense Staff, German Researchers Develop 1st Test for New Coronavirus,
GLOB. BIODEFENSE (Jan. 17, 2020), https://globalbiodefense.com/newswire/german-resear
chers-develop-1st-test-for-new-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/MP39-5P7B].
124. Press Release, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Shipping of CDC 2019 Novel
Coronavirus Diagnostic Test Kits Begins (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/re
leases/2020/p0206-coronavirus-diagnostic-test-kits.html [https://perma.cc/BXR7-FF6H].
125. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 125.
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created by commercial labs, which are otherwise free to create and
deploy their own tests.126 CDC began distributing its test on February 5, but state public health labs immediately noticed that one
component was totally contaminated.127 In a dramatic replay of the
Zika testing episode, CDC first denied the problems and then tried
to fix them while preventing labs from using only the noncontaminated components (which worked)128 or from deploying other tests.
States like New York pleaded for approval to run their own tests
for weeks to no avail.129 It was not until February 29 that FDA
allowed clinical and commercial labs to do their own testing, and
some simply used the elegant German version.130
Even if its tests were not contaminated, CDC never would have
had even close to enough capacity to support the necessary scale
and use of testing nationally.131 Problems with test availability
added to—perhaps cynically explained—overly strict CDC restrictions limiting testing to people who had traveled from
China.132 The first person with a confirmed diagnosis in California
126. Id.
127. Id. at 109–10.
128. Labs figured out that the removing some of the assay components largely improved
the problems. Peter Whoriskey & Neena Satija, How U.S. Coronavirus Testing Stalled:
Flawed Tests, Red Tape and Resistance to Using the Millions of Tests Produced by the WHO,
WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/03/16/cdcwho-coronavirus-tests [https://perma.cc/8ZFT-94SD] (“We had all these state public health
labs that had a perfectly good [test] on their hands, and they knew it, they were upset.”).
129. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 130 (describing intensifying calls by various state and
local health officials asking CDC to allow state labs to do their own testing, which was not
granted until March 13).
130. Whoriskey & Satija, supra note 129 (“James Lawler, director of the global center
for health security and an epidemiologist at the University of Nebraska Medical Center,
was one of the infectious disease specialists who flew out to meet the Diamond Princess
cruise ship passengers in Japan and flew back with them to the United States. Lawler said
the problem was not just in the manufacturing of the test but in the design. In his view, the
test has design problems that make it too difficult for many labs to make it work unless they
have perfect conditions. He said even though the University of Nebraska Medical Center —
a world renowned infectious disease institution that houses the state’s public health lab —
was able to get the CDC version of the test to work, the Nebraska center developed its own
test based on the German lab design published by the WHO.”).
131. Jon Cohen, The United States Badly Bungled Coronavirus Testing—But Things
May Soon Improve, SCIENCE (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.science.org/content/article/unitedstates-badly-bungled-coronavirus-testing-things-may-soon-improve [https://perma.cc/L5V
A-BT9B] (explaining that CDC’s role is to develop a test and provide it to state public health
labs for limited through-put testing, and that commercial labs work mostly by themselves
in developing and scaling testing).
132. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 131. CDC’s initial criteria called for testing only symptomatic patients with a travel history to China or those who may have had contact with a
lab-confirmed coronavirus patient. CDC did not change its criteria until February 27, and
even then, it did not apply to patients with mild symptoms who recently traveled to countries with high case totals like Italy or Iran.
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was denied testing by CDC for days because they lacked a close
connection to Wuhan. The development and targeting of the test
were left almost entirely to CDC; HHS leadership was inexplicably
slow to identify and to aggressively address either issue.133
The resulting lack of testing between late January and early
March,134 combined with a set of unduly strident assumptions
about the virus, wrought havoc on the professional—and public—
epistemology of the disease’s penetration, progression, and transmission. CDC complacency in fielding a test may have resulted
from its expectation that community transmission would be evident in its surveillance system of influenza-like illness. That assumption was badly flawed.135 In a February 21 interview, Fauci
was asked whether the disease was already spreading in US communities. Fauci replied,
Well, certainly it’s a possibility but it is extraordinarily unlikely and
let me explain why. The reason is if there were people who were actually spreading it, you would not have them identified, isolated, and
contact tracing which means you have almost an exponential spread
of infection of which we are all looking out for. We have not seen that,
so it is extremely unlikely that it is happening.136

But it was clear to some then—and would eventually be clear to
all—that cases were not being identified because there were too

133. As Gottlieb notes: “Seeing the CDC’s challenges, the leadership at HHS needed to
mount a concerted effort to develop an alternative, pulling together other public health
agencies with relevant tools such as FDA, NIH, and [BARDA]. There was no plan B. It was
almost as if once CDC tried—and failed—to develop a test for COVID, the focus shifted
exclusively to remedying the CDC test even though the agency was never meant to, and
never would be able to, supply the entire market with testing. When Secretary Azar asked
the CDC why the agency wasn’t shipping its test kits to private hospitals, CDC officials had
to tell him that the agency never provided test kits to the private sector, only to state labs. . .
. Into the late spring, CDC officials still found themselves explaining to the leadership at
HHS that it wasn’t the CDC’s historical role to working with commercial and academic labs,
or to help develop kits. . . . HHS leaders ever convened the departments’ operating divisions,
including FDA, the NIH, and the CDC into an organized effort to tackle the key challenges
we faced.” Id. at 135–36.
134. For comparison, by end of February, South Korea had tested 97,569 people and the
U.S. had tested fewer than 500. Total COVID-19 Tests, Mar 1, 2020, OUR WORLD IN DATA
(Feb. 10, 2022), https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/full-list-total-tests-for-covid-19?time=
2020-03-01&country=KOR~USA [http://perma.cc/S74Y-YDZK].
135. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 82 (describing the obvious limitations of the influenzalike illness surveillance system (the data are lagged, COVID has different symptom profile
than flu, and flu decreased as more people stayed home and wore masks obscuring the rise
in cases of respiratory distress) and quoting a one high ranking official on the task force
that “[t]he public health people on the task force were saying there was no spread, or we’d
see it in the [influenza-like illness surveillance system] . . . [i]t wasn’t until the week of
March 6 that you saw a clear separation and that was retrospective.”).
136. Id. at 85–86.
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few tests to identify them, overly restrictive screening criteria, and
not enough people doing the case finding. On March 1, when CDC
stated there were 75 cases nationwide, later modeling suggests
there were more like 28,000.137 Lack of visibility into penetration
meant an inability to target painful measures. As Gottlieb notes,
If we had more insight into where and how the virus was spreading,
we would have been able to reserve the most stringent measures, like
stay-at-home orders, only for cities where the virus was already epidemic. . . . That’s what the 2005 pandemic plan had prepped for. . . .
That would have reduced the national burden we incurred. It also
would have preserved more credibility for public health officials to
adopt these measures in places where stronger action was needed
later, when the virus finally became epidemic in the South and Midwest. . . . However, at that point, people in states like Arizona, Florida, and Texas were psychologically done with “lockdowns,” having
shut down during the spring, when the virus wasn’t yet spreading
widely in those regions.138

Fauci and CDC officials similarly maintained an immodest confidence that transmission was via droplets from symptomatic people,139 despite growing evidence to the contrary,140 which led to the
deeply mistaken focus on fomites141 and the widespread belief that
masks do more harm than good because people would touch their

137. Id. at 70.
138. Id. at 214–15.
139. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
140. Apoorva Mandavilli, Infected but Feeling Fine: The Unwitting Coronavirus Spreaders, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/health/coronavirusasymptomatic-transmission.html [https://perma.cc/S23G-63C5] (“But since the new coronavirus surfaced in December, they have spotted unsettling anecdotes of apparently healthy
people who were unwitting spreaders. ‘Patient Z,’ for example, a 26-year-old man in Guangdong, China, was a close contact of a Wuhan traveler infected with the coronavirus in February. But he felt no signs of anything amiss, not on Day 7 after the contact, nor on Day 10
or 11. Already by Day 7, though, the virus had bloomed in his nose and throat, just as copiously as in those who did become ill. Patient Z might have felt fine, but he was infected just
the same.”)
141. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 210–11 (“[T]he Coronavirus Task Force believed that
contaminated surfaces (fomites) on mass transit systems may have been contributing to
spread. . . . The theory sprang from an observation inside the CDC that there were a lot of
people falling ill with COVID, where public health workers couldn’t trace their illness back
to some symptomatic patient they’d been in contact with. Underlying all this, the CDC believed that the coronavirus was behaving like influenza, and so the most plausible explanation for these mysterious chains of transmission must be some contaminated surface . . . [i]n
reality, a lot of those puzzling chains of transmission weren’t the result of fomites, but rather, asymptomatic carriers . . . [a]nd since doctors couldn’t test people for the virus, nobody
could firmly uncover those asymptomatic cases. . . . [This preoccupation with fomites] could,
in turn, lead to misguided polic[ies] . . . [h]owever, the spread of the virus probably wasn’t
from shared surfaces but from the aerosolization of respiratory droplets in confined space.”).
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face more often.142 Failure to understand and then track asymptomatic spread became the “Achilles’ heel of Covid-19 pandemic control.”143 Not only did CDC fail to recognize the importance of
asymptomatic and aerosol transmission on the Princess Diamond,
but they missed the undeniable finding that staff could be infected
and transmit, which is exactly what avoidably happened in the
massive New York City surge a month later.144 Other opportunities
to confirm aerosol and asymptomatic transmission were frustrated
rather than supported. Redfield would not allow the Seattle researchers doing the influenza study to test their nasal samples for
almost a month, preventing early understanding of penetration
and spread.145 The important findings from the skilled nursing facility in Seattle sat at CDC for a key month before being published
in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (with thirty coauthors even though it is a simple description of asymptomatic and
probable aerosol spread!).146 It emerged just as the wave was approaching New York City.
Throughout this time period, communications were chaotic and
often flatly and confidently inaccurate. On January 31, a day after
WHO declared COVID-19 a global health emergency, Azar declared it a public health emergency.147 That same day, during the
first Coronavirus Task Force briefing, Azar told the public: “I want

142. See Steven Taylor & Gordon J.G. Asmundson, Negative Attitudes About Facemasks
During the COVID-19 Pandemic: The Dual Importance of Perceived Ineffectiveness and Psychological Reactance, PLOS ONE, Feb. 17, 2021, at 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0246317 [https://perma.cc/K5YH-CUQC].
143. Monica Gandhi, Deborah S. Yokoe & Diane V. Havlir, Asymptomatic Transmission,
the Achilles’ Heel of Current Strategies to Control Covid-19, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2158,
2159 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1056/nejme2009758 [https://perma.cc/QJ8Z-GDPU] (based on
the March 2020 testing, “[a]n important finding of this report is that more than half the
residents of this skilled nursing facility (27 of 48) who had positive tests were asymptomatic
at testing.”). Unfortunately, they sat on it for weeks, running it through multiple layers of
peer review even though it was a descriptive report. When it came out in the Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report, it was too late to avoid weeks of faulty screening guidance that
only symptomatic people should be tested.
144. ‘Red Dawn’ Emails, supra note 77 (quoting email from Carter Mecher, Senior Med.
Advisor, Dep’t of Veterans Affs. (Feb. 20, 2020, 1:32 PM)) (“[W]hat happened on the cruise
ship is a preview of what will happen when this virus makes its way to the US healthcare
system (not to mention institutionalized high-risk populations in the US, like nursing
homes). . . . there is going to be chaos and panic to get anything in place. I doubt that what
we would then hurriedly put in place will be any better than what they did on that cruise
ship.”)
145. GOTTLIEB, supra note 8, at 66–67.
146. Anne Kimball et al., supra note 88, at 377–81.
147. Determination that a Public Health Emergency Exists, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.phe.gov/emergency/news/healthactions/phe/Pages/20
19-nCoV.aspx [https://perma.cc/TYJ9-DTBP].
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to stress: The risk of infection for Americans remains low.”148 On
February 25, he would suggest that “we’ve actually contained the
spread of this virus here in the United States at this point. . . . I
think part of the message to the American people is we all need to
take a bit of deep breath here.”149 A few days later, the Surgeon
General would tweet advising the public not to buy masks, strongly
implying they would not help prevent infection.150
On February 26, Trump replaced Azar with Pence as head of the
task force,151 essentially giving up on concerted and thoughtful action. This was a key moment to address the immediate needs of
congregate settings, many of which lacked the resources and incentives to prevent introduction and rapid transmission among highrisk populations. CDC should have immediately warned the country about skilled nursing facility staff carrying the virus from one
facility to another.152 Facilities lacked the testing and PPE to prevent infection well into the summer.153 On March 13, CMS guidance suggested that nursing homes could admit patients with
COVID-19 who had been released from hospitals.154 Many states
ignored this guidance, creating facilities exclusively for infected
patients, while others like New York interpreted it as a mandate

148. Roston & Taylor, supra note 120.
149. Id.
150. U.S. Surgeon General (@Surgeon_General), TWITTER (Feb. 29, 2020, 7:09 AM),
https://twitter.com/Surgeon_General/status/1244020292365815809/photo/2 [https://perma.
cc/9GKY-VJMY] (“Seriously people- STOP BUYING MASKS! They are NOT effective in preventing general public from catching #Coronavirus, but if healthcare providers can’t get
them to care for sick patients, it puts them and our communities at risk!”); Maria Cramer
& Knvul Sheikh, Surgeon General Urges the Public to Stop Buying Face Masks, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/29/health/coronavirus-n95-face-masks.
html [https://perma.cc/JU9L-4U9D].
151. SLAVITT, supra note 5, at 84 (describing the strange optics of the Vice President
leading a meeting of all HHS secretaries without the secretary there).
152. CDC had a very clear picture of transmission between two skilled nursing facilities
in early March but took three weeks to publish it in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report. Anne Kimball et al., supra note 88, at 377, 379–80. In the period, facilities could
have been preparing to prevent such high-risk arrangements.
153. Dylan Scott, Why the Coronavirus Has Taken So Many Lives in US Nursing Homes,
VOX (June 3, 2020, 3:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/6/3/21279431/nursing-homes-coron
avirus-covid-19-deaths-cuomo-cdc [https://perma.cc/9PF5-Q6JP] (quoting David Grabowski,
long-term care researcher at Harvard Medical School, in June that “we have failed on more
straightforward initiatives such as implementing surveillance testing and providing personal protective equipment . . . We are not much further along today in these areas than we
were in March.”).
154. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., QSO-20-14-NH, GUIDANCE FOR INFECTION
CONTROL AND PREVENTION OF CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) IN NURSING HOMES
(REVISED) 1, 4 (Mar. 13, 2020).
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leading to higher infection rates for residents and staff.155 The federal government also sent antigen tests out to long term care facilities, which had high false positive rates, leading to instances when
residents were infected as a result of inappropriate placement in
COVID-19 isolation areas.156 By May, over two-thirds of deaths in
some states would be in such homes.157 Similar issues plagued carceral settings and high-risk industrial settings like meatpacking
plants.158
IV. WHAT THIS TELLS US ABOUT PUBLIC HEALTH GOING
FORWARD
The serious set of failures we have drawn from detailed accounts
of the initial months of pandemic response shows that a lot went
wrong. Our counterfactual story was meant to drive home the point
that these failures were, first and foremost, failures of judgment.
U.S. public health agencies and their leaders were confounded by
their own professional and personal biases (or so it seems from the
outside) and did few or none of the things decisionmakers can do
to make good judgments in hard times: recognize and act on the
need for diversity and transdisciplinarity in inputs; use debiasing
decision processes to reduce mistakes; deploy a long time horizon
to identify and anticipate contingent challenges and to use time
and learning strategically; act and speak with transparency and
humility about the limits of current knowledge; and anticipate,
155. New York adopted guidelines compelling nursing homes to accept patients discharged from the hospital with COVID-19. Luis Ferré-Sadurní & Amy Julia Harris, Does
Cuomo Share Blame for 6,200 Virus Deaths in N.Y. Nursing Homes?, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/nyregion/nursing-homes-deaths-coro
navirus.html [https://perma.cc/DY7P-WEUB]; Kim Barker & Amy Julia Harris, ‘Playing
Russian Roulette’: Nursing Homes Told to Take the Infected, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020,
3:29 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nation/playing-russian-roulette-nurs
ing-homes-are-told-to-take-the-infected [https://perma.cc/3LCN-NPV9].
156. Katherine J. Wu, Nevada Halts Use of Rapid Coronavirus Tests in Nursing Homes,
Citing Inaccuracies, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/
health/nevada-covid-testing-nursing-homes.html [https://perma.cc/927C-U87Z].
157. Nina Feldman & Ryan Briggs, Pa. Caves to Pressure, Reveals Data Showing
COVID-19 Battered Smaller Nursing Homes, WHYY (May 20, 2020), https://whyy.org/articles/in-philadelphia-region-covid-19-hit-smaller-nursing-homes-the-hardest [https://perma.
cc/AD5N-XM5C].
158. Chad Zawitz et al., Outbreak of COVID-19 and Interventions in a Large Jail — Cook
County, IL, United States, 2020, 49 AM. J. INFECTION CONTROL 1129, 1129 (2021), https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ajic.2021.03.020 [https://perma.cc/Z5U2-X52Q]; Talal Ansari, Covid-19
Cases in Meat Plants Were Much Higher than Previously Known, Report Says, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 27, 2021, 7:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-cases-in-meat-plants-weremuch-higher-than-previously-known-report-says-11635371970 [https://perma.cc/KMW6-6
R74].
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accept, and manage negative or complicating social and political
reactions to action. On the contrary, the first three months of the
response encapsulated behaviors that have bedeviled us to this
day: a parochial gaze within the blinders of epidemiology and medicine; reactive decision making unchecked by any apparent awareness of bias; relentless short-termism; a communications approach
that assumes Americans have the memories of goldfish; and what
looks like considerable confidence in leaders’ political acumen and
persuasive dexterity.
It is crucial to any future for collective, government-driven action for population health that we acknowledge this failure—and
that we do not simply pin it on Robert Redfield, Anthony Fauci, or
Rochelle Walensky. These people and hundreds or thousands of
other health officials and public health professionals that engaged
in the COVID-19 response are products of our system of professional training and differentiation. They were taught to see the
world through epidemiological or medical eyes and to neglect, if not
dismiss, other kinds of knowledge or experience. As many public
health historians and commentators have been saying for a long
time, twentieth century public health followed a path of bacteriology and biomedical science to a comfortable scientistic view of the
production of health while abandoning the field’s messier roots in
social reform and political activism.159 Sitting in rooms with other
people like them, in institutions full of people like them, public
health leaders absorbed key beliefs that animated their later actions: that the people who reached positions of leadership had
unique insights and moral-social authority; that the deference they
paid each other in the pecking order would be paid by people outside the club; that saving lives and preventing morbidity were unquestionably the top social priority; that science—meaning medicine and epidemiology—not only told us what the problem was, but
how to solve it, and in so compelling a fashion that anyone with a
different idea could be ignored and any consideration of how to implement the solution was entirely superfluous.
In the wake of this latest disaster of American public health
practice, something like the picture we have just painted has to be
accepted as an approximate truth. It definitely does not describe
many public health people and organizations. It does not do justice
159. For a concise recitation of this longstanding critique, see Ed Yong, How
Public Health Took Part in Its Own Downfall, ATLANTIC (Oct. 23, 2021), https://www.
theatlantic.com/health/archive/2021/10/how-public-health-took-part-its-own-downfall/6204
57 [https://perma.cc/YKL7-X3PY].
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to the many strands of public health thought and action that are
not just transdisciplinary in the professional sense but are deeply
engaged with communities and practice. But our portrait should
be accepted at least as an approximate truth—because only if we
acknowledge that there is a serious cultural problem can we hope
for the painful reflection and action that is needed to change the
field and its practices.
It has been our purpose to make the case that change is needed.
While a prescription for cure is beyond our capacities as well as our
page limits, we will finish the discussion with a few thoughts. Obviously, training is the place to start. We would agree with those
who say that training for public health work should aim “to train
smart thinkers, not technicians, to embrace challenges and move
the expanding field of epidemiology forward”160—but of course not
just epidemiology. That one science, no matter how much one lauds
John Snow,161 is obviously a grossly deficient basis for addressing
the complex systems and confounding human behaviors that drive
population health. Although admittedly a matter of parochial interest for us lawyers, the century-plus failure of public health to
properly integrate, train in, and properly practice law as a core
skill of the field is a powerful example of what is wrong and what
has to change. The same could be said for psychology, sociology,
and economics, just to start. As many have said, the cultural problem in public health is not just a commitment to a narrow slice of
science, but also a commitment to science to the practical exclusion
of engagement in the social, political, and economic mechanisms
through which the science of social determinants might be translated into the actual conditions for a high level and fair distribution
of health. Taking both of these imperatives into account suggests
we have less need for schools of public health training technicians,
and more need for schools of social problem-solving, training
agents of smart change.
Out in practice, there is a crying need to change where research
funding is put. NIH is the bulwark of a narrow focus of health work
on biomedical and individualized behavioral interventions. It
spends just a fraction of its budget supporting research on mechanisms like law and policy that change social conditions and
160. Bryan Lau et al., Perspectives on the Future of Epidemiology: A Framework for
Training, 189 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 634, 634 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/aje/kwaa013
[https://perma.cc/EP8Z-ZH93].
161. See Michael A.E. Ramsay, John Snow, MD: Anaesthetist to the Queen of England
and Pioneer Epidemiologist, 19 BAYLOR UNIV. MED. CTR. PROC. 24, 24–28 (2006).
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influence behavior millions at a time.162 Public health education,
research and practice would all be more effective if practitioners
were adept in legal epidemiology, and legal epidemiology cannot
optimally grow without a strong research component funded by the
nation’s primary health funder. Of course, legal epidemiology is
just an example. We also need more investment in understanding
the social, behavioral, and economic drivers of health and health
behavior, as well as levers for change. And from the transdisciplinary perspective, these lines all blur in any case.
In practice—in health agencies of all kinds, from CDC to the local health department—little can be done without investing in
many more people and the information technology infrastructure.
But even if such funding was forthcoming, our argument has suggested that things will not improve by hiring more traditional public health trained staff. The health agencies of the future—if there
are any—should be populated by the products of our schools of social problem solving: “smart thinkers, not technicians,”163 strategists, and collaborative, humble people who work in and outside
professional and agency boundaries. And these little islands of (insufficient) public investment cannot be asked or expected to lead
the charge for real reform in the social conditions that ail us.
Philanthropies that are already sticking their necks out to fight
inequality and system dysfunction will have to take more chances
and embrace a longer time frame and a more cooperative approach.
The sanitary movement that started in the nineteenth century
worked for decades to have an impact—time we probably need but
also cannot be sure we have.
The thing we can say with greatest confidence is that the problem will not be solved—or indeed, even addressed—by the public
health “summits” and such aimed at figuring out how to get the
cold hard world to appreciate our brilliance.164 A broken engine
does not need more gas; it needs to be repaired. Nothing that treats
the problem as one of funding or of the public’s or policy makers’
162. See generally Jennifer K. Ibrahim, Aaron A. Sorensen, Heidi Grunwald & Scott Burris, Supporting a Culture of Evidence-Based Policy: Federal Funding for Public Health Law
Evaluation Research, 1985–2014, 23 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 658 (2017),
https://doi.org/10.1097/phh.0000000000000598 [https://perma.cc/BGS2-7YGB] (finding that
NIH does not support public health law research to the extent necessary to evaluate public
health laws efficiently and effectively).
163. Lau et al., supra note 162, at 634.
164. See Future of Public Health Summit Series to Launch; First Summit to Explore How
to Achieve a Diverse and Robust Workforce, CDC FOUND. (Dec. 2, 2021), https://www.cdc
foundation.org/pr/2021-future-of-public-health-summit [https://perma.cc/YH4M-573L].
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failure to appreciate what we do will do any good at all. We should
not ask, as we did at another low point a few decades ago: What is
the future of public health?165 Unless we change the culture, there
really is not a future worth worrying about.
CONCLUSION
We made the case that much of what was apparently not anticipated and prepared for could have been. Public health officials
could have devised a robust, credible strategy that could have
saved lives and reduced social and economic harms. Maybe we are
wrong, and if so—never mind. But to the extent we are right, to the
extent that our national health leaders failed to think, plan, and
act strategically based on best evidence and a diversity of inputs—
well, that is no way to run a country in the twenty-first century.
There is no guarantee that a better process and plan would have
made a big difference: bad leaders, bad budgets, bad institutions,
bad Americans, and one big bad virus all made COVID-19 a terrible challenge. But if we in public health are looking for ways to do
better next time—in the mirror, at what we did, is where to look.
Good judgment can make a difference in any public health matter,
even relatively narrow ones like vaping, youth sport injuries, tobacco control, and the like. It is even more important if public
health is ever to engage effectively against the social determinants
of health, enmeshed as they are in law, politics, inequality, corporate power, and deep social divisions.
Recognizing how enmeshed in deeper social conditions important public health matters are, we should clearly see that epidemiology, even social epidemiology, cannot alone drive a strong
program of research and action for change. We are back where we
started, arguing again that a new public health is needed, one
rooted in its history as a social movement but also aggressively defined as transdisciplinary and silo-breaking. When we understand
the social roots of the opioid death storm—just to take one example—we might well think that we need an anthropologist or sociologist or even a legal epidemiologist at the head of the National Institute of Drug Abuse, not an expert in brain chemistry and
imaging. We might talk about transforming schools of public
health into multidisciplinary schools of social problem solving. We
165. See generally INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH (Nat’l Acads. Press
1988).
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might think that we should reorganize some of these NIH institutes into an aggressive National Institute of the Social Causes of
Illness and Misery.
We talk about change in the organization of public health because, while good judgments can emerge from practices that support good judgment, these practices will be more likely to emerge
in cultural and organizational contexts in which diversity, transdisciplinarity, and practical problem solving are valued. Good judgment and smart action will do better in a public health culture that
questions and breaks down silos rather than strengthening them
in schools, agencies, and funding streams. Just before COVID-19
struck, the United States was ranked number one in readiness for
a global pandemic: it is worth asking how we could have been so
wrong.166

166. See Naomi Oreskes, Expert Opinion Can’t Be Trusted if You Consult the Wrong Sort
of Expert, SCI. AM. (Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/expert-opin
ion-cant-be-trusted-if-you-consult-the-wrong-sort-of-expert [https://perma.cc/73Y3-8WRM]
(“The GHSI panel was understandably heavy with directors of national and international
health programs, health departments and health commissions. But the experts included no
professional political scientist, psychologist, geographer or historian; there was little expertise on the political and cultural dimensions of the problem. In hindsight, it is clear that in
many countries, political and cultural factors turned out to be determinative.”).

